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Poor parents face difficult trade-offs when investing in their children’s education. This dissertation studies
how low-income urban households in Southern India, where child labor is a concern, make educational
investments for their children. First, I build a model that shows how educational investments are shaped
by the possibility of children substituting labor for their parents. Second, I collect parent surveys, child
surveys, and student-level administrative data from schools and construct a linked dataset. Third, I examine
the relationship between educational investments and several pertinent factors, with an emphasis on child
labor substitution and the strength of occupational identity. I find that monetary and time investments in
education are negatively correlated with both child substitution and the strength of a parent’s occupational
identity. Parents who have high aspirations for their children invest significantly more time in their children’s
education. Children who are highly motivated spend more time in school-and study-related activities. Also,
children for whom occupation is important for their own identity perform better at school. I propose plausible
mechanisms underlying these patterns. In addition, I explore the role of mother and child’s beliefs about
returns to education on the investments made by the household. I find that mothers who believe the marginal
returns from college are higher spend significantly more time on their children’s education. Further, I discuss
how the presence of dissonance between the mother and child’s beliefs regarding returns from college and
marginal returns from college affects investments. The findings show that households in which mothers
value the returns from college more than their children the mothers spend significantly more time on their
children’s education. And in the households where children value the marginal returns from college more
than their mothers the children spend significantly more time on their education. My findings highlight the
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“...[Education] can add to the value of production in the economy and also to the income of
the person who has been educated. But even with the same level of income, a person may benefit
from education—in reading, communicating, arguing, in being able to choose in a more informed
way, in being taken more seriously by others and so on.”
- Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, 1999
“If your plan is for one year, plant rice. If your plan is for ten years, plant trees. If your plan
is for one hundred years, educate children.”
-Kuan Chung, 7th Century BC
In this dissertation, I investigate whether low-income parents identify themselves by their occupation,
whether parents substitute their children’s labor for their own, and how these occurrences impact parents’
educational investments for their children. Education is an investment with enduring benefits. Various
reports on “quality education” (which is Goal 4 of the sustainable development goals adopted by the United
Nations [2015]) state that despite major progress made in the past decade, challenges in making education
a basic human right remain. The United Nations projects that the world is not on track to meet its 2030
education targets, with 200 million children expected to be out of school and only 60% of young people
completing upper-secondary education in 2030.1 The UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) reports that
258 million children and youth, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia, were out of school
in 2018.2 Thus, improving education and reducing barriers to education is a critical research and policy
focus. Central to this is the understanding that education is a multifaceted product and that there are




demand side determinants, such as child labor (Basu and Tzanaatos, 2003; Edmonds et al., 2009; Dammert
et al., 2017), conditional cash transfers (Behrman et al., 2011, Parker and Todd, 2017), and perceptions about
returns to education (Jensen, 2010), while other literature focuses on supply side determinants, such as school
infrastructure (Muralidharan et al., 2013), teachers effort and remedial education (Kremer et al., 2005; Duflo
et al., 2007 & 2010; Banerjee et al., 2010; Hanna et al., 2012; Muralidharan, 2012). In this dissertation, I
focus on less-studied determinants, namely, child labor substitution, the extent to which children of parents
in certain occupations help their parents at work, and occupational identity, the extent to which occupation
matters for self-image/identity of an individual.
This dissertation addresses how the educational investment choices, monetary and time (both qualitative
and quantitative), are made in low-income urban households in Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India. I built a model
to set up a conventional framework for analyzing these investment choices in light of trade-offs particular to
the setting of child labor. Using the model as a guiding framework, I narrowed my empirical focus to two novel
variables, child labor substitution and occupational identity. For the empirical analysis, using the population
of marginalized households engaged in domestic work, daily-wage jobs, and small self-employment, I built
a dataset by combining household survey data and school administrative data; I collected this data from
households and schools located in Ambattur, a town in the city of Chennai. Using this dataset, I establish
a link between the exogenous variation in occupation as an identity choice and child labor substitution on
the parental educational investment decisions.
India has the largest youth population in the world. According to projections by United Nations Funding
For Population Activities (UNFPA), India is experiencing a demographic window of opportunity–a “Youth
Bulge” that is expected to last until 2025.3 India made huge advances during the past decade through
a World Bank supported program “Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan” (Education for all), which brought 20 million
children into primary school. Though this mitigated the issue of non-enrollment, the low retention rates
of students continue to persist. While more than 95% of Indian children attend primary school, less than
44% complete grade 10, and the percentage drops further for the higher-secondary grades (11th and 12th).4
While there can be many explanations for these low retention rates, such as school governance, access, equity,
and teacher quality (as has been addressed widely in the literature),5 the main cause of concern is that the
school attrition rate is high in marginalized social groups where child labor is also high.
The International Labour Organization’s (ILO) report on child labor among South Asian countries shows
that in absolute terms, child labor among 5-17-year-olds is highest in India, amounting to about 5.8 million
(Khan and Lyon, 2015). Further, this report shows that in India 0.3% of 7-14-year-olds and 1.7% of 15-17-
3https://india.unfpa.org/en/topics/young-people-12
4“Education in India”- World Bank Report, 2011.
5For detailed review of India’s primary education policy see Muralidharan, 2013.
2
year-olds are represented in the category of “both in employment and in school.” International organizations
such as the ILO, World Bank and UNICEF identify child labor among 5-17-year-olds if children are involved
in: i) hazardous occupations; ii) non-hazardous occupations but long hours of labor (as per the ILO, long
hours are defined as more than 43 hours in a given reference week); and iii) employed below the minimum age
of 15 years old. Further, the provisions in the ILO’s convention of minimum age, (1973 [No. 138]) allow light
permissible work for children above 12 years old.6 In the context of India, this provision of light permissible
work is reflected in the amendment passed by the Indian Government on Child Labor in 2016, which allows
children to work in family enterprises after school hours.7 These provisions are based on the condition that
children can be involved in light work in a way that does not prejudice either their school attendance or school
work. But there is insufficient data on children providing their own labor in the form of substituting for
their parents’ labor, and/or assisting parents at their work after school. Specifically, it is not clear whether
this labor affects student effort and/or schooling outcomes. In essence, trade-offs faced by households when
they engage their children in such market work is not well understood.8 This dissertation addresses this
gap in the economics of education literature and presents findings based on a “case study” approach. The
results show that occupational identity, as well as child labor that takes place in the form of substitution
whereby children help the parent(s) at work, uniquely affect the educational investment decisions made by
the parents.
The empirical data of this study comes from household surveys–parent surveys and child surveys–as well
as school administrative data. The household survey was administered with households and children chosen
from two public schools— Kamarajar Girls Higher Secondary School (hereby School 1) and Sir Ramaswami
Mudaliar Higher Secondary School (hereby School 2)—both of which are located in Ambattur, Chennai.
A randomized stratified sample of students was chosen from these two schools, and the chosen students
and the mother of the chosen students were surveyed. In the parent survey, the mothers were surveyed for
household characteristics: i) occupation substitutability (whether the mother and father are substitutable at
their work), ii) frequency of substitution for the mother’s or father’s work by their children in the past three
months, iii) household spending on the chosen child’s education, and iv) time investment of the mother in
the chosen child’s education. The children were surveyed about the time spent in school- and study-related
activities, labor force participation, and substitution for the parent(s) at their workplace. In addition, both
parent and child surveys included questions on school performance, school absences, and behavioral variables
6see Edmonds and Shrestha, 2012, for a discussion of the impact of minimum age regulation on child labor and schooling.
7See The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2016. (As passed by the Rajya Sabha)
8According to Bharati Pflug “Children from families where the mother is a domestic worker can be found to regularly
accompany and help their mothers at work and so get pulled into domestic work. This is often the case in a city like Mumbai,
India, where both the adult domestic worker and CDWs can come from a poor urban slum area.” (An Overview of Child
Domestic Workers in Asia: ILO/Japan/Korea Asian Meeting on Action to Combat Child Domestic Labour, Chiang Mai,
Thailand, 2-4 October 2002, pp 15.)
3
(such as role models, aspiration and motivation). The children’s school performance data, as measured by the
total points they received on a recent exam and the number of absences, were collected from the respective
schools.
Though studying identity is interesting, it is difficult to measure. While a simple survey question, such
as asking a respondent to make a choice from a set of factors to represent her identity, can appear to be
straightforward, such self-reported choice may not capture identity satisfactorily (see Atkins et al., 2019). My
approach entails a method of validating such that identity is conceptualized through preferences. I construct
an “identity game,” which is played by the mother and child at the time of their surveys. The game is played
in three rounds. Through a specific elimination process and in an order of preference, the mother and the
child elicit their identity from the choice of four factors: occupation, mother tongue, relationship, birthplace.
The outcome of the identity game is measured by: i) occupational identity strength capturing the relative
significance of occupation in each round of the game for the mother and the child, and ii) occupational
identity defined as a binary variable which takes the value 1 if occupation is chosen as the prime factor
to represent identity. I borrow from the occupational science literature the concept that identity is closely
tied to what we do, is developed largely by society, and gets refined at the individual level as a result of
those social negotiations (Christiansen, 1999; Kielhofner, 2002). In the context of India, economically poorer
households are highly represented in the casual labor market.9 Incorporating this behavioral perspective of
occupation as identity in studying the decision-making of poor parents can motivate the economic reasoning
behind the behavior of such a population that is beyond what the standard resource constraints can explain.
The impact of social perception/social image on behavior has been studied in a range of economic
literatures and over time with a focus on the role of self-image/identity in explaining the behavior.10 The
economics literature on identity shows how a person’s sense of self depends on their social category, how
identity influences their choices (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), and how self-image can induce certain norms
and pro-social behavior (Benabou and Tirole, 2006 & 2011). Recent literature on identity explores the role of
identity in labor supply in an experimental setting (Suanna Oh, 2020), how ethnic and religious identity can
be revealed using food consumption (Atkins et al., 2019), and the link between self-image and behavior under
stigma (Ghosal et al., 2019). Further, social image concerns on behavior are shown in voting (Gerber et al.,
2008, Funk, 2010, Della Vigna et al., 2016), education (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2015), and charitable giving
(Della Vigna et al., 2012). However, which factors matter for self-image/identity and how/whether these
factors impact the decision-making of the poor have not been addressed in the literature. While virtually all
economic studies of education consider parent occupation when helping to explain parental decision-making,
9“India Wage Report,” ILO 2018.
10See Bursztyn and Jensen, 2016, for a more detailed review of the literature on social image concerns and social pressure.
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the empirical question not yet understood is: Will how people feel about their occupation impact the choices
they make for the children?
The economic literature on the determinants of children’s attainments is quite extensive. The most
prevalent earlier economic models are Becker-type models (household collective choice under interdependent
preferences) of family behavior. The literature that followed shows that parent IQ, demographic charac-
teristics, whether the child is born out of wedlock and parent separations determine home investments in
education (Leibowtiz, 1974; Haveman and Wolfe, 1994). More recent studies have detailed how the avail-
ability of information and frictions relating to understanding such information can affect parental decision-
making (Nguyen, 2008; Banerjee et al., 2010; Jensen, 2010; Dizon-Ross, 2019). In contrast to these studies,
I study the educational investments of both money and time. A literature review on parental involvement
by Avvisati et al. (2010) points out that economic research is largely silent on parental time involvement,
citing data availability as a major limitation. Among researchers, the use of time use data is seen as a means
not just to understand economic activity but also to understand poverty and human development (Hirway,
2009). Though many developing countries conduct time use surveys, the utilization of such data is not fully
established (Hirway, 2010).
India administered the pilot survey on time use in 1998-99 in six major states and conducted the first
time use survey during the 2019 calendar year. Time use studies (Hoover-Dempsey et al., 2005, Guryan
et al., 2008, Thomsen, 2015) show that those parents with higher earnings potential and those with more
education spend more time with their children. In an economic development context, the literature on
the implications of time spent by parents on children’s learning is limited. Specifically, studies that target
the qualitative time involvement of parents are scarce, including participation in parent-teacher meetings,
whether parents know their child’s difficult subject(s), whether parent converse with children regarding their
school, and parental involvement in school activities. This study helps to fill that gap in the literature by
measuring the time involvement of parents both in terms of time spent helping the child with learning and
also in terms of the engagement of parents in school- and study-related activities. This study on educational
investments is important not just because investments are costly for such low-income households but because
these investments yield returns later on. Focusing on time investments in addition to monetary investments
provides a channel to understand how optimization of education investment decisions of parents in certain
occupations can be uniquely affected.
The empirical analysis is on a linked dataset that I construct using parent surveys, child surveys and
student-level administrative data from School 1 and School 2. I report five sets of main results: first,
the households in which mothers have higher occupational identity strength, that is, who value occupation
relatively more as compared to other factors, invest less money and time on their child’s education. This
5
negative impact is significant for monetary investments. Similar to occupational identity strength, the impact
of binary occupational identity (the households in which mothers chose occupation as the prime factor of their
identity over mother tongue, relationship or birthplace) is negative for both monetary and time investments.
In addition to monetary investments, the negative impact of binary occupational identity is also significant
on the qualitative measurement of time investment. In other words, mothers who chose occupation to
represent their identity seem to know less about their child’s learning. The second main result is that in
households where there is child labor substitution, households invest less money and mothers spend less
time quantitatively in their child’s education as compared to households where there is no such substitution.
The negative impact of child substitution is significant for monetary investments. The coefficient of child
substitution is positive for qualitative time investment. Though the effect is not significant, the positive
impact on the qualitative measurement of time investment says that in households where the child helps,
the mothers are more informed about their child’s learning.
My third main finding is that the inclusion of behavioral variables, such as parental aspiration (hopes
the mother has about their child’s future educational attainment), child motivation (measured in a four
point Likert scale), and whether the mother has a role model for occupation reasons, does not change the
sign and significance of both identity and substitution variables for monetary investments of the household
and time investments in the child. The effect of binary occupational identity on the quantitative measure
of time investment flips sign from negative to positive, and the magnitude of the negative impact on the
qualitative time investment decreases with the inclusion of behavioral variables, indicating that some of the
variation in time investments are explained by the aspirations of the mother and the motivation of the child.
Parental aspiration positively impacts time investments of the mother, and the effect is significant. Also,
the mothers of highly motivated children invest more time quantitatively on their child’s education, and
children with a high motivation score invest more time in study-related activities. Both these effects are
significant, in particular the significance is higher for the time investment by the child. My fourth main
finding is that the children who have higher occupational identity strength and chose occupation as their
primary identity factor invest more time in their education. Though the effect is not significant, the positive
sign of child’s occupational identity on the time spent by the child is an indication of the relationship between
the identity formation and the effort level of students. My final main finding is that school performance of
the children is positively affected by their occupational identity strength, and the effect is significant. This
indicates that the children who value occupation more and who chose occupation as their primary identity
score significantly more points in their exams as compared to children who chose other factors and value
occupation less towards their identity.
A set of simple regressions show the underlying mechanisms behind formation of occupational identity
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and child labor substitution. Among mothers who chose occupation as a primary factor that matters towards
their identity, 83% are working mothers. At the same time, the percentage distribution of the identity choice
of occupation among those employed shows that 16% of employed mothers eliminated occupation in the first
round of the game, 25% in the second round and 43% in the final round. This indicates that about 146
employed mothers out of a total of 228 employed mothers did not value occupation as a primary factor in
their identity. The construct of occupational identity under which occupation becomes a unique identity
is when it is chosen, controlled and goal directed (Christiansen, 1999). As discussed in detail in Chapter
5, occupations such as daily-wage work, domestic work and small self-employment that are represented in
the sample may have been circumstantial for these households and, thus, not a result of a decision-making
process. The “circumstantial” characteristic of these occupations could mean that the 36% of employed
mothers that opted for occupation in the survey as their primary choice of identity may not have selected
occupation due to the importance they placed on their jobs but because of deprived opportunities towards
that choice.
The mothers who reported that their occupations are substitutable have higher occupational identity
strength. In addition, mothers who responded that it is common in their occupation for their fellow workers
to bring their own children to help them at work have higher occupational identity strength. Although it
could be argued that these observations could be specific to the occupations represented in this particular
sample, it is also true that the categories of self-employed and casual labor are highly prevalent among
lower-income populations in many developing countries. This study presents the idea that certain attributes
of occupation lead to occupational identity strength, which in turn impacts educational investments. The
interlink of child labor substitution and occupational identity is observed from the positive relationship of
occupational identity strength on substitution. Although the effect is not significant, the positive relationship
suggests correlation between these two seemingly unrelated variables. Child substitution is particularly high
for the self-employed category. The second most important category where substitution occurs is in the case
of mothers that do domestic work. The frequency of substitution is determined by how familiar a child is in
doing their parents’ work and whether earning potential of parent(s) will increase if the child helps. Both
are highly significant in determining substitution.
In addition to these main results, in chapter 6 of this dissertation, I explore the role of beliefs to returns to
education of the mother and the child on educational investments. Specifically, I study the effect of divergence
in the mother and the child’s beliefs on the educational investments. I find that mother’s beliefs to marginal
returns to college positively correlates with all investments, especially, mothers who believe marginal returns
to college are higher significantly invests more quantitative time on their children’s education. Further, in
this chapter, I extend the idea of cognitive dissonance (orginally by Leon Fistinger, 1957) that Akerlof and
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Dickens (1982) demonstrate in various economic applications, to a particular setting of dissonance between
the parent and child in an household. I find that households in which mothers value the returns to college
more than their children invests significantly more time on their children’s education and households in
which children value the marginal returns to college more than their mothers significantly invests more time
in their study-related activities.
In summary, this dissertation investigates the implications of child labor substitution and occupational
identity— largely disconnected variables—on educational investments. The findings of this study are based
on a descriptive approach that shows how occupational identity and child labor substitution uniquely af-
fect the educational investment decisions made by parents. Under this approach, this study brings a new
perspective on the importance of occupation and identity in studying parental decision-making concerning
education investments. The inclusion of disjoined variables, such as occupation identity and substitution,
can expand our understanding of trade-offs faced by poor parents. Behavioral studies have shown that costly
identity-affirming behaviors can result when people are insecure about “who they are” (Benabou and Tirole,
2011) and how psychological interventions can mitigate the effects of stigma brought on by being poor and
marginalized on individual choices (Ghosal et al., 2019). Though whether certain occupations are stigmatic
is debatable, understanding whether the choices of the poor and marginalized are affected not just by being
in a certain occupation but by “how that occupation is perceived” is a starting point. On this aspect, this
study makes a distinct contribution to the literature of poverty, child labor and educational investments.
The ILO report (2015) highlights the child labor problem in South Asia and the need to study the correlation
of children in school and their employment, especially when they participate in both. My study shows that
children provide their labor to help their parents at work when parents are engaged in certain occupations
and are self-employed. Though child labor laws (both ILO and Indian Child Labor Law) allow for light
permissible work if school attendance/school work is not predisposed, to the best of my knowledge there is
no data available to understand the schooling decisions of children who provide their labor for their parents’
jobs. The cause of concern is not the enrollment rate at school but the underestimation of the opportunity
cost of engagement of children in school- and study-related activities. To this end, the future child labor
surveys should consider including questions to uncover this particular type of labor that will pave the way
to understand the labor market decisions and trade-offs faced by children who are in school and also help
their parents at work. Finally, this study ties the economics literature on educational investments with the
literature on psychology, sociology and anthropology by showing that variations in investment levels are
influenced by parental aspirations and child motivation.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the conceptual framework. Chapter
3 describes the data collection, variables and estimation method. Chapters 4 and 5 present the empirical
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findings and discussion, Chapter 6 describes the role of beliefs and dissonance. Chapter 7 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
2 A MODEL OF EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND CHILD
LABOR
In this chapter I build a model to set up a conventional framework for analyzing educational investment
choices in light of trade-offs particular to a child labor setting. I use the model to guide the understanding
of the basic trade-offs faced by the household. Furthermore, the empirical analysis introduces additional
considerations that could then easily be interpreted as natural extensions to the model.
Assume a two-period model of a household that has one parent and one child. In period 1, the parent
works and helps the child with education and in period 2 the parent retires. The child can supply labor
and study in period 1 and work in period 2. The household monetizes all assets and a maximum potential
labor income to make a budget. The household consumes part of the budget as period 1 consumption and
saves some for the next time period. The savings happens through the educational investments: monetary
investments made by the household on child’s education I, time investment made by the parent on child’s
education, EA and time investment of the child on the education, EC . The educational investments raise
the child’s earning power in the next period given by C2 =f(EA,EC,I). That is, there is some combination
of these investments that most efficiently delivers any level of consumption in the second period. This gives
us a “cost” of delivering period 2 consumption in terms of the period 1 sacrifice, that is, the cost of these
investments say g(C2) is given by I+WAEA+WCEC where the wages of parent isWA andWC is the child’s
wages. Knowing this cost, the household solves a simple two-period utility maximization problem. Under
this setting, the household decides not just on consumption in period 1 but also on educational investments.
Thus, the model setup involves solving for optimal cost of investments first and then the bigger problem of
utility maximization, but the general intuition from the standard model remains. The model abstracts away
from pure savings and borrowings.
2.1 Model Setup





where C is consumption and δ is a constant parameter. Consumption goods are purchased from parent
labor, child labor and household assets, A. The consumption in period 1 satisfies the following constraint:
C1 =WA(TA − EA) +WC(TC − EC) +A− I (1)
The parent, out of total time TA , works for LA hours and spends EA hours helping the child with school
work. The child spends LC hours supplying labor and EC hours studying out of the total time TC . The
consumption in period 2 satisfies,
C2 = f(EA,EC,I) (2)
I also assume the time constraints TA = EA + LA, TC = EC + LC and various other (>> 0) constraints
are satisfied. The household’s decision on child labor and investments become clearer from the first order

























The first order conditions above characterize the trade-offs involved in the household’s decision on in-







, the marginal gain of the investments is








, the marginal gain is higher than the cost and the time investment of parent in







, the marginal gain is equal to the cost, so the parent
divides the time between supplying labor and helping the child with school work.
2.2 Discussion
The model provides a conceptual framework for household decision making on educational investments of the
children. The model set up is in the perspective of the trade-off faced by the low-income households between
consumption and the investments in their children’s education. It generates interesting empirical questions
while pointing out the underlying complexities. The empirical analysis will consider variations in the type
11
of occupations, household wealth, total time of parent and child, time preferences and school characteristics.
The first order conditions described above link the exogenous variations of these variables to the changes in
investments and the consumptions. The model shows the several channels through which the investment level
and consumption are affected. For example, if household wealth, A, increases, the investments rise. This is
also the outcome if the discount factor δ increases. But an increase in child’s wage, WC is counterintuitive.
The direct effects of the increase in WC are the income and the substitution effects. The standard model
will predict that an increase in WC , the child wage, is associated with the increase in the opportunity cost
of studying and therefore, a higher chance of child working more and causing consumption in period 2 to
decrease (the pure substitution effect). Under this, the level of investments decrease. But an increase in
WC expands the family income, causing the consumption in both periods to go up, that is, the investments
increase as a result of total income. These direct effects are as predicted by the standard model. Under this
model, there is another potential indirect effect whereby consumption in period 2 can be increased under the
case of higher wages for the child. The educational investments/consumption in period 2 can also be bought
using monetary investments of household I and the time investment by the parent, EA. So this dampens
the effect of a price increase, that is, the substitution effect. Both the income and substitution effect are in
the same direction thus predicting higher level of investments. Thus the budget constraint is not severely
flattened as in the case of the standard model. I refer to this as the “reallocation effect”.
The goal of the dissertation is not to try fit the empirical data into this conventional choice model but
rather to use the model as a general framework to understand how the households decide on educational
investments. Taking this model as an outline, in the empirical part of the study I focus on the behavioral
aspect of the occupation, that is, “occupational identity” and “child labor substitution”– child helping the
parent at work–. Identity is an overarching concept that can shape the choices individuals make. To avoid any
theoretical ambiguous effects this may produce, I devise a separate experiment of an identity game through
which I infer whether occupation matters for identity. Using empirical evidence, I demonstrate whether
educational investments made by parents vary if occupation matters the most towards their identity. In
the context of the model, the child wages WC can be interpreted as substitution and occupational identity
is beyond the model and can be perceived as a variable that affect the level of investments directly, which
inturn cause changes in period 2 consumption.
Educational investments will have a different impact on children depending on whether the child is
exclusively in school. In the dissertation, I focus on a particular setting of child labor in which the child
substitutes for parents at work and/or works alongside the parent at their workplace, that is, a school-going
child providing labor to help the parent. As this is central from a development perspective, the empirical
data focuses on low-income households engaged in occupations such as domestic work, daily-wage work and
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small self-employment, where the parent-child labor substitution is likely to be high. The chapters that
follow will explore:
1. Do parents that engage in certain occupations identify themselves through their occupation? How does
this “occupational identity” impact their choices of educational investments they make for their children?
2. To what extent do children of parents in certain occupations help their parents at work? How does
this “child labor substitution” impact household choices of educational investments?
2.3 An Example with Functional Forms
The Household’s problem is to maximize
ln(C1) + δln(C2)
subject to the full income constraint
C1 + g(C2) = A+WATA +WCTC
Step 1: Cost Minimization Problem: Household minimize:

























This gives the cost of second period consumption, that is, g(C2) =
C2
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Step 2: Utility Maximization Problem: Household maximize





= A+WATA +WCTC (12)










C2 = δC1γθ (15)









) + ln(A+WATA +WCTC) + ln(γ) + ln(Q) + αln(α)− αlnγWA + βlnβ − βlnγWC (16)
Under this formulation, lnWC represents the pure substitution effect and the full income, ln(A+WATA+
WCTC) represents the pure income effect. A higher child wage causes consumption in period 2 to be costly
interms of period 1 consumption, that is, everytime the household tries to buy C2 using EC , it costs more
with higherWC interms of C1. An higher child wage income expands the family budget, which leads to more
consumption for both periods. But, C2 is also a function of I and EA. This reallocation mitigates the effect
of the price rise, that is, the substitution effect.
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CHAPTER 3
3 DATA, VARIABLES AND ESTIMATION
3.1 Study Sample
In this dissertation, I study how parents of low-income households in Chennai, Tamil Nadu make educational
investments for their children in terms of money and time. Specifically, I focus empirically on the variables
“child labor substitution” (whether the children of the household provide their labor to help the parents
at work) and “occupational identity” (whether occupation drives parental self-image). Given this focus, I
deliberately narrow in on the population engaged in occupations such as domestic work, daily-wage work
and small self-employment. The empirical data for the study is derived from field work that involves the use
of household survey data and school administrative data from households and schools located in the town
of Ambattur in the state Tamil Nadu in India. Ambattur is part of a major metropolitan city Chennai,
which is well known as one of the oldest industrial belts of the state. Ambattur has the largest small-scale
industrial zone in South Asia, comprising automobile component, garment export and engineering product
manufacturers.
Generally speaking, the Indian workforce is categorized into either agricultural workers, household in-
dustry workers (include workers engaged in family-run enterprises) and other workers. The labor market of
Ambattur is skewed towards the “other workers” category. More than 95% of the labor force in Ambattur
belongs to this non-agriculture and non-household industry.11 The employment rate of women in Ambattur
is about 20%.12 Much of the labor force in Ambattur with less education is employed at these various
small-scale industries located in the industrial zone. The concentration of female employment in Ambattur
is especially high in these sectors. Notably, this work is highly volatile; Girls are withdrawn from school
and enter into this labor market at the early age of 19 and stay for just a short span of time (Kalpagam,
1981; Swaminathan and Jeyaranjan, 1999). This high turnover in female employment in Ambattur, which
is not explained by marriage and migration (Swaminathan and Jeyaranjan, 1999), when combined with
low labor force participation rates in the town, leads to a reasonable conjecture that women of low-income
households resolve to the other types of informal employment, such as domestic work, small self-employed
and daily-wage work.
The study sample consists of households and children chosen from two public schools located in Ambattur.
The schools that participated in the study are Kamarajar Girls Higher Secondary School (hereby School 1)
11Census of India, 2011.
12Census of India ( 2011). District Census Handbook: Thiruvallur.
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and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar Higher Secondary School (hereby School 2). These two schools were chosen
to control for neighborhood characteristics and to allow for some heterogeneity in the population. School 1
is an all-girls school and School 2 has a co-educational structure. Both schools have grade levels from 6th
to 12th, with many sections of classes for each grade. Both schools administer the medium of instruction in
both English and in the regional language, Tamil. The total enrollment in School 1 is 2,795 students and in
School 2 is 1,831 students. The study sample consists of a stratified random sample of 160 students from
each of these schools. To arrive at this random sample for School 1, from the student roster (which is a
handwritten record of students), I stratified the school population by medium of instruction, and for School
2, I stratified by medium of instruction and then by gender. The total number of students from each section
of a class in the sample was based on the section’s proportion to the total in the respective stratum. The
actual participants for the study from each section were then chosen by using a random number generator.
The home addresses of the chosen students were provided by the schools, and the student and parent were
approached for the surveys. Out of the chosen 160 households, 152 households from School 1 and 153 from
School 2 were surveyed.13
Data collection in this study included: i) the implementation of two survey instruments, and ii) collection
of school performance and absences data on the chosen students from the respective schools. The survey
instruments included a parent survey by which the mother of the chosen child was surveyed and a child survey
by which the chosen child was surveyed. The choice to survey the mother is twofold: survey-based literature of
parental involvement in children’s education shows a higher participation of mothers as respondents (Nguyen,
2008; Dizon-Ross, 2018) and secondly, the study focuses on occupations of parents that tend to be gendered
toward females in India, such as domestic work and small self-employment, such as garland making and
food catering. In the parent survey, the mother is questioned about household characteristics, occupation
substitutability, whether the children of the household substitute for their parent’s work, household monetary
spending on the chosen child’s education, time investment of the mother in the chosen child’s education,
and mother’s preference of factors affecting her identity. The chosen child is surveyed about the time spent
in school and study-related activities, labor force participation, substitution for parents at their workplace,
and preference of factors that matter to child’s identity. In addition, both parent and child surveys included
questions on school performance on the recent exam, number of absences at school, and behavioral variables
such as role models, aspiration and motivation. The data received from schools included the total test points
received in the recent exam by the chosen children and their total days of absences for the months of June -
November 2018.
13The households that were not surveyed resulted from a wrong address or unavailability of the respondent.
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Household and Respondent Characteristics
Tables 1a, 1b and 1c present the descriptive evidence on the mother, the chosen child and the household
characteristics. Table 1a shows the distribution of empowerment of the mothers in various household decision-
making related-activities. The empowerment of the mother is verified in the parent survey by questions such
as whether the mother would seek healthcare by herself in the event of her sickness or her children’s sickness;
whether she has a bank account in her name; and her involvement in decisions regarding children’s education,
health and household finances. About 88% of the mothers said they would seek healthcare by themselves
if they get sick and 93% of mothers said they would seek healthcare without a spouse’s help if their child
gets sick. About 90% of the mothers said they have a bank account for themselves; 40% of the mothers
make decisions about their children’s education; and 56% decide on household finances. In all categories of
decision-making, the percentage of mother’s decision-making by herself exceeded her spouse’s share. The
average size of the household is 4.49 persons, and the average age of the mother is 38 years-old. About 58%
of mothers have less than a high school education; 38% have completed anywhere between the 9th and 12th
grade; and the remaining 4% have a college degree. Over 92% of the mothers said they wished they had
completed more education. The financial difficulty was cited by 48% of the mothers for not completing more
education, followed by the reasons of child labor, early marriage, and academic difficulty. About 16% of the
mothers in the sample had worked as a child either for pay or had helped their parents at work.
Of the total sample, 75% of the mothers said they were employed. Fifty percent of the total employed in
the sample are represented under a daily-wage occupation, which represented the highest occupation category.
Other categories of occupation include 18% in domestic work, 14% in self-employment and 18% in private
and government organizations. One person among the employed is an agricultural worker. About 83% of
mothers with less than or equal to a high school education are represented in the private and government
occupation category. Much of this group is employed in the small-scale industries/factories located in the
industrial zone. About 86% of employed mothers said their monthly pay would decrease if they miss a
workday. This pay decrease is highly reported by mothers who earn daily wages at 92% followed by both
self-employed and private/government employed at 88%. Among the occupation categories, domestic workers
reported the lowest likelihood of pay decrease at 63%. A possible reason for this lower percentage could be
the complex employer-employee relationship as the work takes place in the unconventional work place setting,
the “household.” Thus reducing the pay for absence may not be strictly enforced.
Out of the total sample of 305 households, 269 respondents reported on their spouse’s occupation details.14
The occupation distribution for the spouse shows that 61% are in daily-wage jobs, 20% are self-employed,
14The decrease in responses for “spouse occupation” is in some cases because the respondents were single mothers and in some
cases the respondents refused to talk about their spouses.
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18% are in private and government employment, and 1% are in agriculture. The pay decrease for missing a
workday is highly reported for self-employed workers at 98%, followed by daily-wage workers at 94%, private
and government at 90%, and 67% among agricultural workers. The average monthly total income of both
mother and father in the sample is Rs 13,886, which is approximately equivalent to US $662 adjusted for
purchasing power parity.15 Household wealth is calculated by principal component analysis of the various
asset variables, such as the type of durable assets the households possess, whether the household owns their
home, the type of home, access to electricity, type of fuel, sources of water, access to sanitation facilities and
other financial resources. The distribution in the sample for basic infrastructure of sanitation, water and
access to electricity shows that 88% of the sample have own sanitation facilities, 43% have own water sources
and everyone in the sample has access to electricity. The survey question on financial stability showed that
for 67% of the households, their children’s income is the only source of financial resource for the future.
Chosen Child Characteristics
The sampled children were 14 years of age on average and primarily aged between 11 and 18. In the
overall sample, 74% are girls and within School 2, which has co-educational structure, 48% are girls and
52% are boys. About 46% of the chosen children are first born and the average grade level is 9th grade.
For a multiple response question, 60% of mothers in the sample chose school quality as the reason for their
choice of school. Within School 1, 59% of mothers cited the single-sex school as the reason for their school
choice. Overall, about 57% of the chosen children are taught in English as the medium of instruction. The
proportion of enrollment in the English medium is higher for School 1 at 68% compared to 47% for School
2. Within School 2, girls enrollment in the English medium is marginally higher (3% more) than for boys.
Of the total sample, 30% of the children go for tutoring. The percentage of children getting tutoring help
at School 2 is higher at 35% as compared to 25% at School 1. The academic difficulty and lack of help at
home are the most cited reasons to get the extra help through tutoring. In about 12% of the sample, the
households had other kids who had dropped out of school. The most cited reasons for dropping out of school
were that the kids were not interested in attending school, financial difficulty, and labor force participation,
either for pay or to help their parents at work. The chosen children were asked to report the intensity of
parental involvement in their study-related activities as measured on a scale of 1-4 for four questions. A
maximum score of 16 signifies the highest level of parental engagement. The average of parental involvement
for the entire sample is 10.84. The School 2 parents are engaged more with a score of 11.31 as compared to
10.38 for School 1 parents; the difference is statistically significant at a 1% level. When asked about their
preference to accept a similar occupation as their parents, about 10% of the chosen children responded that
they would assume the same occupation as their parents, citing that they like their parents occupation. The
15OECD data on PPP (2018).
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majority of chosen children who had responded “no” cited parents low earnings as a reason.
3.2 Variables
The key set of independent variables that are of primary focus for the study are substitution and identity
variables.
Substitution Variables
In this study, labor substitution refers to a specific type of child labor substitution whereby children
provide their labor to help the parents at their workplace. In the context of this sample, examples of such
child labor substitution include: children accompanying their mother who is a domestic worker to help her;
children helping the parent/s who are self-employed; and children performing work-related tasks for parents
who are daily-wage workers. The substitution decision of the parent is captured by the following questions
in the survey. In the parent survey, first I asked the mother i) whether her occupation or her spouse’s
occupation are substitutable, that is, if they do not show up for work, can anyone substitute for them; ii)
whether the children have ever done the work that the mother or father does; iii) in general, have the parents
taken any of the children to work with them or have they sent them instead; and iv) how many times have
they taken or sent their children to help in the past three months.
The responses for the qualitative question in (iii) above are coded as 1 if the parent took or sent the
children to work, and 0 if not. The responses for the quantitative variable in (iv) are coded as 1 if the parent
took or sent the child instead of them for 1 to 2 times, 2 if 3 to 5 times, 3 if more than 5 times, and 0 if
never. I define the frequency of substitution as the average of the number of times the child substituted
for the mother and/or father. Since the focus is to study variations in educational investments between
households where there is labor substitution and households where there is no such substitution, I define a
binary variable for substitution that takes a value of 1 for any non-zero value of frequency of substitution
variable defined above and this binary substitution variable is the independent variable in the regression
analysis. Given the study’s objectives, I also do not differentiate between children working alongside the
parent and those entirely substituting for their parent.
The substitution variable captures the substitution by any of the children in the household and not
just by the chosen child. The rationale is twofold: i) the purpose is to study how child labor impacts the
spending decisions of the household and labor substitution by any of the children in the household will affect
the resources available and hence the spending decisions of the household; ii) secondly, for a household that
employs its children, it is difficult to argue that only a certain child helps, and this could particularly be
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true if a parent is self-employed. The chosen child’s high participation in labor substitution of the household
is captured and justified in a couple of ways. I ask in the survey, which of the children in the household
typically help the parent at work, and in 85% of the positive substitution responses, the chosen children
have substituted. A similar set of qualitative and quantitative questions of substitution are asked of the
chosen child as part of the child survey, and the independence between responses of the parents and the
chosen child is rejected at a 1% level. In addition, the independence of the binary variable that measures
whether a chosen child has substituted and the binary substitution variable of parent responses is rejected
at a 1% level. Further, I check the independence of whether the chosen child has substituted and the binary
substitution variable for mother and father, and the independence is rejected at a 1% level.
Tables 2a, 2b and 2c present the summary statistics of substitution variables. About 84% of employed
mothers said their occupation is substitutable and among the mothers who have employed spouses, 74%
reported that their spouse’s occupation is substitutable. Table 2a shows the percentage distribution of sub-
stitutability across occupation categories of the mother and father in the sample. The substitutable attribute
is highly reported by the daily-wage category for both mother and father. From the parent survey, 7% of
households had substituted their children’s labor for their parent’s labor. Out of that, 60% of child substi-
tution happened only for the mother’s work and 20% is for the father’s work exclusively, and the remaining
20% substituted for both the mother and father. Table 2c presents the distribution of substitution for the
mother and father. Among the children who substituted for the mother, 67% of the children substituted for
mothers who are self-employed, 25% substituted for mothers who are domestic workers and 8% substituted
for mothers who are daily-wage workers. Among the children who substituted for father’s work exclusively,
75% of children substituted for fathers who are self-employed and in 25% the fathers are daily-wage workers.
In the case where children substituted for both the mother and father, in 75% of substitution the parents
are self-employed and in 25% the parents are daily-wage workers.
In the overall sample, 65% of the substitution is by female children, and within School 2, which is a co-
educational school, boys substitute marginally more than girls at 58%. There is no strong association between
gender and labor substitution for the mother/father. The responses for substitution from the children are
marginally higher at 9% as compared to parent responses. In summary, the substitution responses show that
this type of child labor prevails and it is high among self-employed parents. There are 69 households in the
sample that are in self-employed work and 22% of those reported that they employ their own child. Given
that the reported substitution is highest for the self-employed category, there is a reasonable conjecture of
possible under-reporting.16
The substitution variables are negatively correlated with monetary educational investments and quanti-
16see discussion in Panel 2 of Khan and Lyon (2015) ILO report on the possibility of under-reporting by parents.
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tative measure of time investment (time spent by the mother on the child’s education). Child substitution
is positively correlated with the qualitative measure of time investment, which measures the involvement of
parents in child’s education from socio-behavioral perspectives. Further, child substitution is more likely to
happen if the mother had worked as a child either for pay or to help her parent. The association between
own-child substitution and mother working as child is strong and significant at a 5% level. The substitutable
attribute of the occupation—whether the occupation is substitutable by others—is negatively correlated with
the actual substitution. As shown in Table 2a, the self-employed category for which children substituted
more for their parents, reported that their work is less substitutable. As part of the parent survey, few other
variables that motivate child substitution are measured such as: i) whether the children have ever done the
work of the mother/father; ii) whether the earnings potential of the mother/father increases if children help,
and iii) whether the mother has observed her coworkers bringing their children to help at work. All these
variables are coded as binary and the summary statistics are presented in Table 2b. All three variables are
statistically significantly associated with both the overall quantitative measure of substitution that include
both mother and father’s substitution and also with the variables that measure the substitution for the
mother and father separately. The correlation is significant at a 1% level. Finally, it is worth noting the
approach of not using the “substitutable” attribute of occupation which may have arguably more exogenous
variation in capturing the effect of substitution on investments. First, the intention is to study the effect of
own child substitution in the educational investments made by the households. Secondly, occupation being
substitutable in general may not imply actual substitution. In this sample, as noted earlier, child labor
substitution happens higher for parents who are self-employed and parents in that occupation category least
reported that their occupation is substitutable.
Identity Variables
Identity or self-image of an individual can be measured in more than one dimension. In this dissertation,
I study whether “what one does as an occupation” is a principal means through which people express their
identity. For this, I construct an “Identity Game,” which is played by the mother and the chosen child as part
of their surveys. In the game, by a specific elimination process and in an order of preference, the mother and
child elicit a factor as their identity from a choice of four factors. The primary objective is to study whether
the parents who chose occupation as their identity make educational investments more or less as compared
to parents who chose other factors. The case for occupation to represent one’s identity is widely supported
in the identity literature in economics, sociology and anthropology (Becker and Carper, 1956; Christiansen,
1999; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). In addition to occupation, the other choices presented in the identity
game are the birthplace, mother tongue/language and relationships (Mother of, wife of, daughter/son of).
Though these three other choices can be perceived to be identity-related for any population of interest, they
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Figure 1: Identity Game
are highly relevant in the context of India. The diversity in India is measured through caste, language,
religion, and class and historians refer to these as “axes of conflict.”17 According to Sengupta,18 “language
is not just an academic endeavor that needs to be studied, probed, and analyzed, but it is a way of life.”
The society’s dynamics are highly dependent on migration, especially internal migration (Indian Census,
2011). The place of birth is highly linked with all the dimensions of caste, religion, language and social class.
Further, Indian society is collectivistic and various relationships signal the cultural importance towards this
collectivism.19 So, the rationale to choose these other three factors is that they are comparable to occupation
in both personal and cultural perspectives.
The identity game is set up as a board game whereby the factors of interest are depicted in pictorial
form and were also described in words as shown in Figure 1. The game is played in three rounds. In the
first round, the player received seven pawns and was asked to make an allocation among the four factors as
follows: they should place two pawns in the factors that mattered to them the most and one pawn in the
factor that did not. The factor that received one pawn is eliminated from the game. In the second round, the
player is given five pawns to make a similar allocation among three factors, and in round three, the player
gets three pawns to choose among two remaining factors. The factor that receives two pawns in round 3 is the
17Guha Ramachandra, “India After Gandhi.” Harper Collins, 2007.
18Sengupta Papia, “Language as Identity in Colonial India: Policies and Politics.” Macmillan. 2017.
19Chadha, N.K., Intergenerational Relationships: An Indian Perspective. 2012.
22
principal factor that represents the player’s identity. Before the actual game, for practice, players are asked
to do the allocation of pawns among four cards marked A, B, C and D. After the practice round, the actual
game was administered with the factors– occupation, mother tongue/language, relationships, birthplace—
and the players were asked to make a careful selection as the factor that will stand out at the end of the
elimination rounds will represent their identity.
The outcome of the identity game is measured by the variables “occupational identity strength” and
“binary occupational identity.” The occupational identity strength captures the relative significance of occu-
pation as a factor for each round of the game. It takes a value of 1 if occupation is deleted in round one, 2 if
deleted in round two, 3 if deleted in round 3, and 4 when occupation is never deleted. The binary variable
of occupational identity takes a value of 1 if occupation is chosen as the primary factor to represent identity.
Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c show the summary statistics of the outcome of the game. The order of preference of
most chosen to least chosen factors by mothers are: relationship, occupation, mother tongue and birthplace.
Overall, in the sample, the relationship factor is the most preferred choice of mothers towards identity at
41% as opposed to 32% of the choices were for occupation. The least preferred choice was birthplace at
12%. Table 3a presents the distribution of occupation status and the choice of identity of the mother. The
domestic workers made the highest choice of occupation as their identity, that is, 43% of domestic workers
chose occupation as their prime identity factor; 39% among private and government employed; 31% among
self-employed; and 34% among daily-wage workers. The unemployed mothers had the lowest selection of
occupation as identity at 22% and had the highest choice towards relationship at 54%. The choice of oc-
cupation as identity is higher for School 1 mothers as compared to School 2 mothers, and the difference is
significant at a 10% level. There is no significant relationship between the gender of the chosen child and
the mother’s choice of occupation as their identity.
Table 3b presents the distribution of identity choices for children and their mothers occupation status.
The children of domestic workers had the highest choice of occupation as their identity at 68%. The children
of unemployed mothers had the lowest choice of occupation as their identity at 58%. The order of preference of
most chosen to least chosen factors for children are: occupation, relationship, mother tongue and birthplace.
In the overall sample, 61% of the choices were for occupation. The least chosen factor is birthplace at
5%. The choice of occupation was highest among girls as compared to boys. Within School 2, which has co-
educational structure, 48% of boys chose occupation as opposed to 71% of girls. This difference is statistically
significant at a 5% level. The boys chose both relationship and birthplace at a higher rate as compared to
girls. The least chosen factor by both mothers and children is birthplace. The correlation between the
mother’s identity choice and the child’s identity choice is positive for all factors except for relationship,
which is the most popular selection for mothers. The correlation is particularly significant for the choices of
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mother tongue and birthplace.
The occupational identity strength of the mother is negatively correlated with both monetary and time
investments of the household. The correlation is significant for both monetary and qualitative time invest-
ments. The occupational identity strength of the child is positively and significantly correlated with both
the time investment in education made by the child and school performance. The correlation is negative
and significant with the total missed days at school as measured by total absence. The occupational identity
strength of the mother is positively correlated with the binary substitution variable indicating that mothers
who value occupation more tend to substitute child labor for their labor more. The occupational identity
strength of the mother is positively and significantly correlated with the substitutable attribute of the occu-
pation. In other words, if the mother responded that her occupation is substitutable, she is likely to value
occupation more towards her identity as compared to occupations that are not substitutable. The occupa-
tional identity strength of the child is negatively correlated with the substitution but not in a significant
way. Table 3c shows the distribution of occupational identity strength of the mother and the chosen child.
The percentage values shows that children have retained occupation factor much longer as compared to their
mothers. Statistically, the occupational identity choice pattern of the children is independent of the choice
pattern of mothers.
Key Dependent Variables
The dependent variables that I focus on in this dissertation are investments made by the household on
the child’s education, including monetary investments of the household, time investment of the mother in
the child’s education, and time investment of the child in the education. These variables are constructed
based on questions in the context of the chosen child in the household survey.
Monetary Investment of the Household
This variable measures the total household spending on the chosen child’s school fees, school supplies,
tutoring, and other school-related purchases for the academic year 2018-2019. Table 4 presents the summary
statistics on the dependent variables. On average, annual households’ monetary spending on the chosen
child’s education is Rs 6,760 (US $324 at PPP). On average parents of School 2 children spend more at Rs
8,358 (US $398 at PPP) as compared to parents of School 1 children, whose average monetary spending is
Rs 5,150 (US $245 at PPP); the difference is statistically significant. Tables 5a and 5b show the summary
statistics for separate categories of spending by occupation categories of the mother. The spending of School
2 parents on school-related purchases exceeds the spending by School 1 parents in most categories, the
biggest difference being expenditures on school fees and tutoring cost. School 2 is a government-aided school
as opposed to School 1, which is purely a government school so the former one involves higher school fees than
the latter. If school fees are excluded, the difference in monetary spending gets smaller but still the spending
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of School 2 parents is significantly higher than that of School 1 parents. Within School 2, parents of male
children invest statistically significantly more than the parents of girl children. The monetary investment
is negatively correlated with both key independent variables of child substitution and occupational identity
strength. In the Appendix, the Tables A.31 and A.32 show the statistical difference in dependent and other
few variables between two schools and between genders for School 2.
Time Investment of Parent - Quantitative Measure
The integration of the time budget with the money budget is necessary to understand the accurate
allocation of full income of households (Becker, 1965). Along with monetary investments, I study the impact
of time investments of the household in the children’s education. I measure time investment of the parent in
their child’s education in two ways — a quantitative measure of time spent by the mother on the child’s study-
related activities and a qualitative measure of parental involvement in school related-activities and in their
child’s learning. The time investment quantitative variable measures the actual time spent by the mother on
a typical school day on their child’s school-and study-related activities. This variable is constructed based
on the standard measure of a 24-hour recall of previous day activities adopted by many time use surveys.20
I vary from the standard measure by asking the following question in the parent survey: “How much time do
you spend on a typical school day helping the child with school related work”? On average, mothers spend
24 minutes of their time in a day helping their child with school-and study-related activities. The time use
survey conducted during 2019 for India show, on average, women spend 134 minutes a day caring for the
children, teaching their own children and accompanying children to places.21
Table 6a shows the distribution of time spent by mothers of different occupational status. On average,
the unemployed mothers spend the highest time of 30 minutes per day as compared to employed mothers.
Among employed, mothers doing daily-wage work spend more time (26 minutes) as compared to mothers in
other occupations. The self-employed mothers spend the least amount of time (14 minutes per day). The
mothers of School 2 children spend, on average, 10 minutes more than the mothers of School 1 children, and
the difference is statistically significant. Within School 2, mothers of girls spend, on average, 34 minutes
daily as compared to mothers of boys, who spend 26 minutes, and this difference in the time spent between
the genders is statistically significant. The correlation between grade level and the time spent by the mother
is negative, indicating children at higher grade level receive less time investment and the correlation is
significant. The quantitative time measurement is correlated negatively with both the occupational identity
strength and the substitution variables.
Table 6b show the distribution of allocation of time in a typical workday on various activities such as
20American Time Use Survey.
21For a detailed review see: Time Use in India-2019, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, National Statis-
tical Office (New Delhi: Government of lndia).
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time spent on work, household management, leisure, personal hygiene, household-related shopping, being
idle and other categories. Among the employed, the average time spent on work is 7.5 hours. The women
in the sample spend on average 3.6 hours on cooking and cleaning and reported 1.9 hours of leisure and
entertainment activities. About 43% of the women reported an average idle time of 1.7 hours a day. In the
Appendix, in Table A.33, I have provided the comparisons of time allocation of women in India and the US
on major activities such as household management, care for household members and leisure and recreational
activities using the time use data for India and US for 2019. The time use data for 2019 for US was collected
for 9400 individuals. The time use data for 2019 in India was collected for 138,799 households (447,250
individuals) during January 2019-December 2019. It covered all of Indian union excluding Andaman and
Nicobar Islands. The average total time spent on household activities per day by women in the US is 2.54
hours as opposed to 4.98 hours by women in India. The total time spent in leisure and recreation by women
in the US is 5.12 hours per day as opposed to 2.75 hours by women in India. The women in the US spend 2.37
hours per day on caring for household members as opposed to 2.23 hours by women in India. Though the
comparison and the numbers have to be interpreted carefully as the data represent different populations, it
does give an overall picture of the time allocation of developed and developing country and more importantly,
it shows the significance of such data on time dispositions from both the global and development perspectives.
Time Investment of Parent - Qualitative Measure
In addition to quantitative measures, I study the impact of qualitative time investment, which measures
the parental involvement in the child’s education in a socio-behavioral sense. The measure is constructed
based on the survey questions: i) how often does the mother ask the child about what they are learning at
school; ii) does the mother know the child’s favorite subject and most difficult subject; iii) were any measures
taken to address the difficulties; iv) did the parents go to the recent parent-teacher meeting; and v) given six
categories of school-related conversations, can the mother recall those. For each question, a binary variable
was created that equals 1 if the answer is yes, 0 if it is no, except for the first question, where the answer
choices were coded as 0 if never asked, 1 if asked once a month, 2 if asked every week and 3 if asked every
day. The coded variables for these 11 questions were added to generate a qualitative score between 0-13, and
then converted into a standardized z-score by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
The average of the qualitative time investment measure is 0.
Table 7a shows the distribution of qualitative time investment by occupational status. Except for domestic
workers, all of the other occupation categories have positive z-score for the qualitative time investment. The
mothers who are private and government employed have the highest z-score followed by the self-employed and
unemployed. The correlation between the qualitative time investment and occupational identity strength of
the mother is negative and significant. The correlation with the substitution variable is positive, indicating
26
the mothers of children who substituted for their parents are more involved in their child’s education in a
qualitative sense. Among households in which child substitution happens, about 95% attended parent teacher
conferences as opposed to 82% of households where there is no substitution. In addition, mothers of the
children who help the parent at work can recall school-related conversations at a higher percentage compared
to mothers whose children do not substitute. The qualitative time investment measure is higher for School 2
than for School 1, and within School 2, parents of girl children have a higher qualitative score than parents of
boys; both differences are statistically significant. Table 7b and Table 7c show the descriptive statistics for all
individual components used to construct the z-score of qualitative time investment for different occupation
categories of the mother.
Time Investment of Child
This is a quantitative measure, which I construct on the basis of the following question in the child survey:
“How much time is spent on a regular school day at school, at tutoring, doing homework and reading other
than school materials?” The sum of the total time for all these categories is the educational time investment
of the child. On average, chosen students spend 11.07 hours in school-and study-related activities in a typical
school day. The difference between the two schools is not significant and the difference in the time investment
between the genders within School 2 is also not significant. Table 8a shows the distribution of time investment
of the child for different occupational status categories of the mother. The children of self-employed mothers
who had the highest child substitution reported the least time investment in education. Table 8b presents
the descriptive statistics of time spent by the chosen child on various activities in a typical school day. The
top three activities in terms of higher time engagement are school, homework and entertainment/play. In
the overall sample, girls statistically spend more time performing household chores, and within School 2,
girls spend more time, on average, on household chores and less time on entertainment/play as compared to
boys; the difference is statistically significant. The time investment of the child is negatively correlated with
both the child substitution variable and the occupational identity strength of the mother. The difference in
the time investment made by the children who substitute for parents is significantly less than the children
who do not substitute. The correlation is positive and significant with the occupational identity strength of
the child, indicating that children who value occupation more as a factor towards their identity spend more
time on the study-related activities.
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3.3 Schooling Outcomes
The school administrative data included the chosen student’s days of absence and performance in a recent
examination. A set of forms were issued to the class teachers at both schools, and they were asked to enter
this administrative data of absence and performance in the respective forms for the chosen students. School
performance is measured by the test scores received by the chosen students. For School 1, the scores were
received for the first-term examination and for School 2, for the second-term examination. Students in grade
levels 6th to 10th take exams in the subject areas of Tamil (regional language), English, math, science and
social science. The students in 11th and 12th grade levels are tested, in addition to Tamil and English, in
their core subject specializations. The core subjects specialization are referred as “groups”. The science group
involve the subjects math, physics, chemistry and biology. The computer science group is similar to science
except biology is replaced by computer science. The commerce group specialization involve accountancy,
commerce and economics. In School 1, test grades for grade levels from 6th to 9th are recorded as letter
grades, which were converted to numerical values as per the conversion scale provided in the State Education
Department’s guidelines. The test scores were then calculated as absolute total points received in all the
respective subject areas.
Tables 9a and 9b presents the descriptive evidence of schooling outcomes by grade level, school and
gender. The total points are significantly higher for chosen students of School 1 and students who’s medium
of instruction is English, as compared to students who receive instruction in the regional language. Within
School 2, girls received significantly higher test scores than boys. In the overall sample, students who go for
tutoring score significantly higher on average than non-tutored students. The total test scores are negatively
correlated with the substitution variable but not in a statistically significant way. The total test scores are
positively and significantly correlated with the occupational identity strength of the child, and the children
who chose occupation as their primary factor of identity score significantly higher than students who chose
other factors. Especially the preference towards occupation increases for students who scored equal to and
above the average of the total points. For the overall sample, the average of total points is 263.43. The
average occupational identity strength value is 3.2 for children who scored below average total points and
for those who scored equal and above the mean total points, the average occupational identity strength
increases to 3.5. The total test scores are negatively correlated with the occupational identity strength of the
mother. A possible explanation could be, among the employed, domestic workers had the highest identity
strength towards occupation, and their children received lower test scores than the average test scores in
the overall sample as noted by Table 9c. When the average total points is considered separately for both
schools, the children of domestic workers at School 1 scored higher than the school average. Since 63% of
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domestic workers in the sample belong to School 2, in the overall sample the average test scores of children
of domestic workers who also has the highest occupational identity strength is low.
The data for absences were received for the months of June to November of 2018 for both schools and
was calculated as the difference between the total working days of the schools and the number of days the
student was present. Both schools worked a total of 121 days from June to November. On average, students
were absent for 18 days, and there is no significant difference in the total absence between the two schools.
But within School 2, boys were significantly more absent than girls. Total absences are positively correlated
with the substitution variable, that is, children who substitute more also had more absences. The children
who had the highest occupational identity strength had a significantly lower number of absences. Total
absences are significantly negatively correlated with total points, indicating children who had the higher test
scores also had lower absences.
In the context of school performance, I measure a behavioral variable “parent-child disagreement” in the
parent survey that captures how frequently the mother and child disagree about the time spent in study-
related activities. The variable takes the value of 4 if disagreement happens every day, 3 if they disagree a
few times a week, 2 if once a week, 1 if very rarely, and 0 if never. The correlation between parent-child
disagreement and total test scores is negative and significant at the 1% level. The disagreement is higher for
School 2 children and their parents as compared to School 1, and the difference is statistically significant.
Within School 2, boys disagree with their parents at a significantly higher rate as compared to girls, and the
difference between the two schools is due to this higher disagreement rate for boys. As the children start to
value occupation as a factor more towards their identity, they tend to disagree less with their parents.
Other Behavioral Variables
The surveys capture a few other behavioral and psychological variables such as role models, aspiration and
motivation for both the mother and the chosen child. The existing literature shows how the information gap
in educational benefits of households is reduced through “role model” intervention, how child’s motivation as
measured by the child’s belief about why schooling is important for their future, and parental aspiration as
measured by what they hope to happen in their children’s future impact the child’s educational attainment
(Nguyen, 2008; Gorard et al., 2012).
Role Model Choices
In both the parent and child surveys, I asked the respondents to identify a person who they perceive
as their role model and to choose a reason for that from a set of given choices. Tables 10a and 10b show
the distribution of such choices for the mother and child, respectively. The reasons for a role model for
the mother include occupation, inspiration for own children, successful family, better spouse, education,
famous celebrity, kindness and the person helps the mother in the time of need. The choices for the children
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include occupation, caring, beauty, a motivating teacher, education and a famous celebrity. Over 30% of
mothers cannot name anyone as their role model as opposed to 2% of the chosen children. The top three
reasons for a role model for mothers are kindness (27%), occupation(18%), and being famous (15%), and
for the children it was occupation (26%), being famous (25%), and education (20%). Among mothers, the
self-employed category had the highest choice for role model due to occupation trait and for children of
daily-wage mothers, occupation trait mattered the most in a role model. Out of two schools, 53% of children
at School 1 had chosen a teacher to be their role model as compared to 47% of children at School 2. A binary
variable for mother and child is defined that takes value 1 if occupation trait was a reason to choose a role
model. The correlation of role model binary variable with occupational identity strength for mother is weakly
negative and for the child the relationship is weakly positive with the child’s occupational identity strength.
The correlation of mother’s role model binary with the substitution variable is positive and significant. If
the mother made a choice for a role model due to occupation trait, the total points of the child is higher,
and the correlation is significant.
Parental Aspiration
Parental aspiration measures the future hopes of the mother on educational attainment of the children.
This is captured by the survey question: “Is there a level of education that the parent wants the children to
absolutely achieve?” The variable takes a value of 1 if the expectation of the mother is elementary level of
education, 2 if high school, 3 if college, and 4 if graduate degree. Three percent of the mothers chose high
school level of education, 79% chose college degree as the minimum educational attainment and 18% chose
graduate degree. Table 11 present the distribution of aspiration levels for different occupational categories
of the mother. The mothers who are daily-wage earners have the highest percentage of aspiration (level 4).
Self-employed mothers had the lowest aspiration level of 2. The correlation of parental aspiration with both
the substitution and the identity strength variables are weakly positive. Yet parental aspiration is positively
correlated with the test scores of the child at a 1% significance level. The average test scores of the children
that have a parent with a aspiration level of 2 is 178.1, which is below the mean of the total points of 263.43.
For parent with a aspiration level of 3, the mean test scores of the children are 261.22, which is little less
than the overall mean of the test scores. For the parent with an aspiration level of 4, the average test scores
are 289.06. Overall, the School 1 parents have marginally higher aspiration levels than School 2 parents, and
the difference is significant at a 10% level. There is no significant variation in the aspiration of parents with
respect to the gender of the child.
Child Motivation
Motivation measures the child’s decisions about education and indicates how the child carries out such
decisions. From the child survey, the motivation is measured from the statements: “I study so my future
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will be financially secure; I work hard at school to get into a good college/university; I want to be in a
better occupation than my parents.” For each of these statements, the responses are coded in a Likert scale:
“1-Strongly disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-Agree, 4-Strongly Agree.” The motivation indicator is the sum of the
responses. For the overall sample, the average motivation is 11.14. The School 1 has a higher mean of
11.24 as compared to 11.04 for School 2 children, and the difference is statistically significant. There is
no significant variation in motivation between genders in School 2. Child motivation is significantly and
positively correlated with both the child’s occupational identity strength and total test scores, indicating
children with high levels of motivation value occupation more as a factor towards their identity and perform
well in exams. As presented in Table 12, 61% of children of the private and government employed have
the highest motivation score of 12, followed by children of mothers engaged in daily-wage work at 53% and
children of unemployed mothers at 44%. Child motivation and parental aspiration levels are positively and
significantly correlated.
3.4 Estimation
To evaluate the impact of substitution and identity variables on educational investments, I estimate the
following regression specification:
Yilj = βo + β1Ii + β2Si + β3Jji + β4Tli + β5Ki + β6Hli + εijl (17)
where Yilj indicates the dependent variables of interest of respondent l, chosen child j at household i,
such as monetary investment of the household on chosen child’s education, quantitative time investment of
mother on chosen child’s education, qualitative time investment of mother on chosen child’s education and
time investment of child in school- and study-related activities. The coefficients β1and β2 capture the effect
of valuing occupation relatively more as compared to other factors of the identity game and the effect of the
child substituting for parents at work on educational investments respectively. Jji controls for child specific
characteristics such as type of school, birth order and gender of the chosen child. Tli controls for mother’s
characteristics of occupation, age and education. Ki represents the income and wealth level of the household
iand Hli represent the father’s occupation. I also estimate the above specification with the binary versions
of identity. The coefficient on binary occupational identity captures the relative difference in investments
between households that choose occupation as the primary factor of their identity and households that choose
one of the other factors: mother tongue, birthplace or relationships.
I estimate additional specifications that include chosen child occupational identity as control variables
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along with other exogenous variables described above, and I test scores of the chosen children as a dependent
variable with similar controls as the above specification. Finally, I estimate a few other regressions that
involve studying the impact of the behavioral variables, such as parental aspiration, role model and child
motivation along with similar controls described above on educational investment variables.
Table 1a: Distribution of Empowerment of Respondents
Obs Mean Standard Deviation
Will seek healthcare if sick (0/1) 305 .88 .32
Will seek healthcare if child is sick (0/1) 305 .93 .25
Have bank a/c (0/1) 305 .90 .30
Empowerment
- On Children’s Education (1-6)a 305 2.03 .95
- On Children’s Health (1-6)a 305 1.79 .95
- On Children’s Discipline (1-6)a 305 1.96 .98
-On Food-Related Purchases (1-4)b 305 1.37 .75
-On Managing Finances (1-4)b 305 1.60 .77
-On Major Purchases (1-4)b 305 1.90 .82
Notes: Data source is the Household Parent Survey.
a 1=Respondent, 2=Respondent’s Spouse, 3= Jointly, 4=Other HH Members, 5=Outside Family, 6= Doesn’t Happen.
b1=Respondent, 2=Respondent’s Spouse, 3= Jointly, 4=Other Family Member.
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Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics of Household and Chosen Child Characteristics
Obs Mean Standard Deviation
Panel A. Respondent Background
Age (in years) 305 38 5.87
Education 305 3.79 1.49
Education (in years)a 305 6.9 4.03
Occupation
- is a domestic worker (0/1) 305 .13 .34
-is private/government employed (0/1) 305 .13 .34
-is self-employed (0/1) 305 .10 .31
-is a daily-wage worker (0/1) 305 .37 .48
-is an agricultural worker (0/1) 305 .00 .06
Occupation Severity (0/1) 227 .86 .35
Time Preference (0-6)b 305 1.25 1.6
Had worked as a child (0/1) 305 .16 .36
Panel B. Household Background
HH size 305 4.49 .94
Respondent’s Spouse Age 278 44 6.06
Spouse Education 276 4.02 1.41
Spouse Occupation
-is private/government employed (0/1) 305 .16 .37
-is self-employed (0/1) 305 .18 .38
-is a daily-wage worker (0/1) 305 .53 .50
-is an agricultural worker (0/1) 305 .01 .1
Assets- Basic Infrastructure
-Lighting Sources(1-2)c 305 2 0
-Water Sources(1-3)d 305 2.26 .74
-Sanitation Sources(0-2)e 305 1.88 .35
Total Assetsf 305 2.26e-09 1.51
Total Income (in Rs) 305 13887 6314
Panel C. Student/Chosen Child Background
Age (in years) 305 14 1.93
Grade Level 305 9 1.99
Medium of Instruction (0/1)g 305 .57 .50
Is a Male (0/1) 305 .26 .44
Birth Order 305 1.7 .77
Goes to Tutoring (0/1) 305 .30 .46
Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey.
a 0 if less than Primary, 2 if Primary, 4.5 if Elementary, 7 if Upper Elementary, 10 if High School, 16 if College and 18 if Graduate.
b 0=never switched to higher future amount; 1-6 = denote the switching point in the given six choices to higher future amount.
c1=Kerosene; 2= Electricity.
d1=Water delivered by local corporation; 2= Shared Faucet/Well; 3= Own Faucet/Well.
e0=No Sanitation Facility; 1= Shared Sanitation Facility; 2= Own Sanitation Facility.
f Principal Component Analysis of Total Assets.
g0= Regional Medium of Instruction; 1= English Medium of Instruction.
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Table 1c: Percentage Distribution of Occupations of Respondents and Spouses
Respondent Total No of Households % Among Employed










Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey. Out of a total sample of 305, 228 are employed respondents and 269 of
spouses of respondents are employed.
Table 2a: Percentage Distribution of Substitutable Attributes and Occupations
DWa P/Gb SEc DWAGSd AGRIe
Occupation Substitutable
- Mother’s Occupation (%) 90 80 38 96 100
- Father’s Occupation (%) - 82 26 88 100







Table 2b: Summary Statistics for Substitution Variables
Obs Mean Standard Deviation
Respondent Occupation Substitutable (0/1) 305 .63 .48
Spouse Occupation Substitutable (0/1) 305 .66 .48
Child Substitution - Qualitative (0/1)a 305 .08 .27
Child Substitution - Quantitative ( 0/1)a 305 .07 .25
Children have done mother’s work (0/1) 305 .16 .37
Children have done father’s work (0/1) 305 .04 .19
Earning potential of mother increases if children help (0/1) 305 .07 .26
Earning potential of father increases if children help (0/1) 305 .03 .18
Substitution Common-Mother’s Occupation (0/1) 305 .04 .19
Notes: Data Source is the Household Survey. a The continuous qualitative and quantitative substitution variables are
measured as average of intensity of substitution for the respondent (mother) and her spouse (father). The binary substitution
is coded 1 for non-zero values of those averages.
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Table 2c: Percentage Distribution of Substitution for Occupations
DWa P/Gb SEc DWAGSd AGRIe
For Mother’s Occupation (%) 25 - 67 8 -
For Father’s Occupation (%) - - 75 25 -
For Mother’s and Father’s Occupation (%) - - 75 25 -






Table 3a: Distribution of Identity Choices and Occupation of the Mother
Occupation Mother Tongue Relationship Birthplace
Domestic Work (%) 43 15 30 12
Private/Government (%) 39 10 29 22
Self-Employed (%) 31 25 41 3
Daily-Wage (%) 35 11 42 12
Agriculture (%) 100
Unemployed (%) 22 15 54 9
Notes: Data Source is the Household Survey. There was only one agricultural worker in the sample. The numbers represent
the distribution of choices within an occupation category.
Table 3b: Distribution of Identity Choices of Chosen Child Across Occupations of Mother
Occupation Mother Tongue Relationship Birthplace
Domestic Work (%) 68 10 15 8
Private/Government (%) 61 12 25 2
Self-Employed (%) 59 13 22 6
Daily-Wage (%) 63 13 19 5
Agriculture (%) 100
Unemployed (%) 58 17 20 5
Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey. There was only one agricultural worker in the sample. The numbers
represent the distribution of choices of the chosen child within an occupation category of the mother.
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Table 3c: Distribution of Occupational Identity Strength: Chosen Child and Mother
Child’s Occupational Identity Strength
Mother’s Occupational Identity Strength 1 2 3 4
1 5 14 27 54
2 10 7 28 55
3 3 15 16 66
4 6 9 18 67
Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey. Identity strength takes value 1 when occupation is deleted in round 1; 2
when deleted in round 2; 3 when deleted in round 3; and 4 when never deleted.
Table 4: Summary Statistics of Education Investments
Obs Mean SD
Monetary Expenditures (in Rs) 305 6760 3833
Monetary Expenditures Alternate (in Rs) 305 4838 3231
Time Investment - Quantitative (in hrs.) 304 .40 .62
Time Investment - Qualitative (z-Score) 305 0 1
Time Investment - Child (in hrs.) 305 11.07 1.51
Notes: : Data Source is the Household Parent Survey. The monetary investments alternate is total monetary spending by the
households, excluding the school fees component.
Table 5a: Summary Statistics of Monetary Investments
Obs Mean Standard Deviation
Monetary Spending on School Supplies, Fees, Transportation (in Rs) 305 5653 2749
Monetary Spending on Tutoring and Other Special Classes (in Rs) 305 1090 2307
Monetary Spending on Other Study-Related Purchases (in Rs) 305 16 287
Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey.
Table 5b: Summary Statistics of Monetary Investment by Mother’s Occupation Categories
Obs Mean Standard Deviation
Domestic Work (in Rs) 40 6485 3789
Private/Government (in Rs) 41 6398 3172
Self-Employed (in Rs) 32 6936 3259
Daily-Wage (in Rs) 114 7024 3699
Agriculture (in Rs) 1 3300 -
Unemployed (in Rs) 77 6676 4589
Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey.
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Table 6a: Distribution of Time Investment: Quantitative, by Occupation Status of Mother
Mean Standard Deviation
Domestic Work (in hrs.) .31 .65
Private/Government (in hrs.) .36 .46
Self-Employed (in hrs.) .24 .42
Daily-Wage (in hrs.) .44 .64
Agriculture (in hrs.) 0 0
Unemployed (in hrs.) .48 .71
Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey.
Table 6b: Distribution of Time of Mother on Various Activities in a Typical Day
Obs Mean Standard Deviation
Work (in hrs.) 228 7.5 2.9
Cooking and Cleaning (in hrs.) 305 3.6 1.5
Leisure and Entertainment(in hrs.) 305 1.9 1.4
Personal Things (in hrs.) 305 1.1 .63
Running Errands (in hrs.) 305 .60 .62
Idle (in hrs.) 305 .74 1.2
Other Things (in hrs.) 305 .04 .26
Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey.
Table 7a: Distribution of Time Investment: Qualitative Z-Score, by Occupation Categories
Mean Standard Deviation






Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey.
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Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey.
a= How often mother asks the child about learning (0-3)
b= Does the mother know child’s favorite subject (0/1)
c= Does the mother know child’s difficult subject (0/1)
d= Did the parent/s take any measures to address any difficulty in academics of the child (0/1)
e= Did parent/s go to parent-teacher meetings (0/1)
f= Can mother recall conversation - About a Class (0/1)
g= Can mother recall conversation - About Teacher (0/1)
h= Can mother recall conversation - About Exams/Class Tests (0/1)
i= Can mother recall conversation - About Homework (0/1)
j= Can mother recall conversation - About Classmates/School Friends (0/1)
k= Can mother recall conversation - About other School Related Topics (0/1)
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Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey.
a= How often mother asks the child about learning (0-3)
b= Does the mother know child’s favorite subject (0/1)
c= Does the mother know child’s difficult subject (0/1)
d= Did the parent/s take any measures to address any difficulty in academics of the child (0/1)
e= Did parent/s go to parent-teacher meetings (0/1)
f= Can mother recall conversation - About a Class (0/1)
g= Can mother recall conversation - About Teacher (0/1)
h= Can mother recall conversation - About Exams/Class Tests (0/1)
i= Can mother recall conversation - About Homework (0/1)
j= Can mother recall conversation - About Classmates/School Friends (0/1)
k= Can mother recall conversation - About other School Related Topics (0/1)
Table 8a: Summary Statistics of Time Investment of Chosen Child by Mother’s Occupation
Obs Mean Standard Deviation
Domestic Work 40 11.03 1.5
Private/Government 41 11.18 1.4
Self-Employed 32 10.98 1.6
Daily-Wage 114 11.04 1.4
Agriculture 1 11 -
Unemployed 77 11.13 1.7
Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey.
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Table 8b: Distribution of Time of Chosen Child: Various Activities in a Typical Day
Obs Mean Standard Deviation
Household Chores (in hrs.) 305 .43 .54
School (in hrs.) 305 8.6 .58
Tutoring (in hrs.) 305 .67 1.1
Homework (in hrs.) 305 1.7 1.2
General Reading (in hrs.) 305 .08 .26
Help Siblings with School Work (in hrs.) 305 .16 .33
Entertainment/Play (in hrs.) 305 1.6 1.1
Work for Pay (in hrs.) 305 .01 .23
Help Parents at Work (in hrs.) 305 .06 .27
Help Parent at Petty Shop/Small Business (in hrs.) 305 .06 .36
Notes: Data Source is the Household Child Survey. The numbers denote the allocation of time in a typical school day.
Table 9a: Summary Statistics of School Performance by Grade Level and School
Grade Level Overall Mean SD School 1 School 2
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD
6 229.89 88.20 12 304.75 61.94 24 192.46 74.95
7 231.79 85.34 16 279.06 50.84 22 197.41 89.69
8 267.62 99.34 14 302.14 80.14 15 235.40 107.09
9 234.17 89.49 19 227.34 61.12 32 238.22 103.45
10 256.94 76.64 26 257.23 97.24 22 256.59 43.49
11 306.67 94.48 34 280.62 83.70 14 369.93 91.68
12 300.78 87.87 30 294 87.25 24 309.25 89.77
Notes: Data Source is the School Performance Data from schools. SD= Standard Deviation. The numbers above are the absolute
total of total test scores received by the chosen children.
Table 9b: Summary Statistics of School Performance by Grade Level and Gender- School 2
Grade Level Boys Girls
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD
6 9 170.44 85.43 15 205.67 67.53
7 12 170.83 75.56 10 229.30 98.59
8 9 219 103.06 6 260 117.94
9 19 216.32 101.90 13 270.23 100.99
10 11 250.36 30.74 11 262.82 54.24
11 7 358.57 99.65 7 381.29 89.33
12 13 294.38 104.96 11 326.82 68.46
Notes: Data Source is the School Performance Data from schools. SD= Standard Deviation. The numbers above are the absolute
total of total test scores received by the chosen children.
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Table 9c: Distribution of Total Points by Mother’s Occupation Category
Obs Mean SD
Domestic Work 40 250.95 94.43
Private/Government 41 287.60 83.50
Self-Employed 32 250.72 98.25
Daily-Wage 114 260.41 92.14
Agriculture 1 297.50 -
Unemployed 76 266.39 95.89
Notes: Data Sources are the Household Parent Survey and School Performance Data.
Table 10a: Distribution of Role Model Choices of Mother by Occupation Categories of Mother
Reasons DWa P/Gb SEc DWAGSd AGRIe UNEf
Occupation (%) 23 22 29 14 - 14
Inspiration for Own Children (%) 4 9 19 8 - 6
Successful Family (%) 12 6 14 6 100 2
Better Spouse (%) - - - - - -
Education (%) 19 - 10 10 - 16
Famous Celebrity (%) 12 16 10 14 - 22
Kindness (%) 23 38 14 29 - 25
Helped the Respondent (%) 8 9 5 18 - 16
Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey. The percentage distribution is calculated based on total responses of 208







Table 10b: Distribution of Role Model Choices of Chosen Child by Occupation Categories of Mother
Reasons Domestic Work Private/Government Self-Employed Daily-Wage Agriculture Unemployed
Occupation (%) 29 15 23 32 100 22
Caring (%) 18 25 19 14 16
Beauty (%) - 3 1
Motivating Teacher (%) 5 13 6 10 19
Education (%) 16 20 29 20 18
Famous Celebrity (%) 32 25 23 24 24
Notes: Data Source is the Household Child Survey. The percentage distribution is calculated based on total responses of 298 responses.
In the total sample, there is one agricultural worker.
41
Table 11: Distribution of Parental Aspiration Levels by Occupation Categories of Mother
DWa P/Gb SEc DWAGSd AGRIe UNEf
Parental Aspiration-High School (%) 2 - 9 3 4
-College (%) 88 83 72 74 100 82
-Graduate (%) 10 17 19 23 - 14







Table 12: Distribution of Child Motivation Levels by Occupation Categories of Mother
Domestic Work Private/Government Self-Employed Daily-Wage Agriculture Unemployed
Child Motivation-5 (%) 1
8 (%) 2 3
9 (%) 18 2 6 9 3
10 (%) 10 7 15 17 21
11 (%) 30 27 38 21 100 31
12 (%) 40 61 41 53 44




4.1 Impact of Identity and Substitution on Monetary Investments
The estimation specified in equation (17) in the data collection chapter is estimated by ordinary least squares.
The tables presented in this chapter capture the main results. In the Appendix, I present the same results
as blockwise regressions, where the controls variables are added as blocks. The household characteristic
block represents the mother’s age, education, occupation and father’s occupation; the socioeconomic block
represents the asset level and total income; the child block represents the gender and the birth order, and
the last block is the school effect.
Tables 4.1-4.4 present the estimates of the substitution and identity variables relationship with the in-
vestments made by the household, both - monetary and time investments. All specifications are controlled
for total income, wealth, father’s occupation, and respondent characteristics such as occupation, age, and
education; and child-specific characteristics, such as type of school, gender, and birth order. In each of these
tables, column 1 shows the effect of child substitution on the respective investment variable with the set of
controls mentioned above; the column 2 shows the effect of occupational identity strength, column 3 shows
the effect of binary occupational identity and finally column 4 shows the effect on investments, including
both substitution and binary identity with other controls. Child substitution for the parent is measured by
averaging the number of times the child substituted for their mother and father in the past three months.
Since the purpose is to study the impact on educational investments for child substituting households as
compared to households that does not let the child substitute for parent labor, the substitution variable is
coded binary, which takes the value of 1 for any non-zero values of the average. The coefficient of this binary
variable of substitution, “child substitution,” is interpreted as changes in investments between households
that substitute the child’s labor for parent labor and households where there is no such substitution.
Column 1 of Table 4.1 shows the effect of substitution on monetary investments controlling for household
and child characteristics. The coefficient on substitution suggests that the children in households in which
the child has substituted spend less on school- and school-related purchases. The coefficient of substitution
has a larger magnitude and a significant at 10% level in all specifications. In the columns 1 and 4, which
show the effect of child substitution on monetary investments, the mothers who are in daily-wage occupations
spend less as compared to other households. As the education level of the mother increases, households make
less monetary investment. Part of this is explained by the grade level of the children, which is positively
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correlated with the total monetary educational spending of the household, and mothers of children in higher
grade levels (10th - 12th) have lower levels of education. The mothers of children at lower grade levels (from
6th - 9th grade) spend less than the overall mean of monetary spending in the sample. Including the grade
level as independent variable changes the sign of the effect of mother’s education but not in a significant
way.
The households with older mothers spend more on their child’s education, and the effect is significant.
The total income and wealth level of the household has a positive effect on monetary investments and is
significant in all specifications at the 5% level. The households of School 1 children, that is, the all-girls school,
significantly invests less than the households of the School 2 children. As noted in the previous chapter, the
households of School 2 spend more in all categories of monetary spending.22 This result is consistent with
the gender variable, indicating parents of male children spend significantly more. The children of higher
birth order receive less investment, and the effect is significant. Table A.2 in the Appendix presents the
block regressions to evaluate the change in the estimates of child substitution, where the control variables
are added as blocks. The negative impact on monetary investments due to child substitution is consistent
for all blocks and substitution is significantly affected when the school fixed effect is added. Out of the
total child substitution, 40% is represented by School 1 children and 60% is from School 2, which has higher
monetary spending as compared to School 1. Hence, the overall decrease in monetary investments due to
substitution is also higher.
To study the impact of occupational identity choice on educational investments, I define two measures
of occupational identity for the regression analysis: occupational identity strength and binary occupational
identity . The occupational identity strength measures the relative importance of “occupation” as a factor to
represent one’s identity as compared to other factors in each round of the identity game. The binary identity
variable takes the value 1 if occupation is chosen to be the primary source of identity and 0 if any of the other
factor that is, mother tongue, relationships or birthplace is chosen. Identity is a multi-dimensional concept
here. I attempt to capture the impact on investments not just when occupation is chosen as a primary
factor of identity but also the effect on investments if the factor occupation is valued marginally more in
a given round of the game. The coefficient of identity strength measures the effect of retaining occupation
for one more round in the game on the monetary investments made by the household. The coefficient on
the binary identity variable captures the relative difference in investments between households where the
mothers chose occupation as the primary source of identity and mothers who chose other factors (mother
tongue, relationships or birthplace).
22Specifically, the biggest component of spending difference is due to school fees. School 1 is a government school and school
2 is a government-aided school. In the appendix, in Table A.17, I have produced the same results for the monetary investment
excluding the school fees. The significance of the main variables such as substitution and identity do not change.
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Column 2 of Table 4.1 shows the impact of occupational identity strength on monetary investments. The
coefficient shows as occupation becomes a stronger choice to represent identity, the households spend less
on the child’s education, and the effect is significant at a 5% level. This negative impact is after controlling
for household characteristics of wealth, income and father’s occupation, mother’s characteristics of age,
education, occupation, and child characteristics of school, gender and birth order. Of the total number of
mothers who had the highest occupation strength value of 4, that is, the mothers who consistently valued
the occupation factor more, about 83% of these mothers are employed with the distribution of occupation
categories of: 21% in domestic work, 20% in private/government, 12% in self-employment, and 48% in daily-
wage work. But within each category of employment, domestic workers had the highest value of occupational
identity strength of 4 at 43% as compared to other categories of work. The monetary investments are the
sum of 12 categories of spending towards school, school- and study-related supplies and outside learning
opportunities. The comparison of spending between the two extreme values— occupational identity strength
of 1 (occupation deleted in round 1 of the game) and 4 (occupation never got deleted)—shows that the
households in which the mothers had the lowest identity strength of value 1 exceeded the households in
which the mothers had the highest identity strength of value 4 in about 7 categories out of 12.
I repeat the specification in column 3 with the binary identity variable. The coefficient of binary identity
variable is consistent with the negative sign of the identity strength variable and is significant at a 5% level.
But the magnitude of the coefficient is almost double the coefficient of the identity strength variable. Thus,
the binary measure of occupational identity predicts a larger decrease in monetary investments. Finally, I
also check the effect on monetary investments with both substitution and binary identity variables given by
the specification in column 4, because in about 40% of households where children substitute for their parents,
mothers also valued occupation as a factor more as compared to other factors. The sign and significance
for both coefficients remain the same, but the magnitude of both variables decrease by a small amount
as compared to the magnitude in the regressions, which does not control for both. Table A.1 provides the
estimates for the block regressions for occupational identity, and the sign and significance of identity strength
remain consistent in all specifications. This indicates that the magnitude of negative impact is high when
socioeconomic characteristics is controlled and this magnitude is reduced a bit when the school fixed effect
is added. But the significance of identity strength variable on monetary investments is consistent at 5%
with all blocks. Further, in the appendix, in Tables A.20 and A.21, I present the results of these regressions
under the two variations of mother’s education: education measured in years and categories of education
levels included as binary variables. The sign and significance of both identity and substitution variables do
not change under these both variations and consistent with Table 4.1, mother’s education is not a significant
determinant of monetary investments.
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4.2 Impact of Identity and Substitution on Time Investments
4.2.1 Time Investment - Quantitative Measure
Next, I turn to Table 4.2 which reports the impact of substitution and identity on the time spent by the
mother on the child’s education-related activities in a typical school day. The dependent variable is a daily
measure of the total time spent in hours by the mother in helping the child with school- and study-related
activities. As described in the data collection chapter, this measure is developed along the lines of 24-hour
recall of the previous day activities adopted by most of the time use surveys. I vary from this by asking the
mother, in a typical school day routine, how much time of the day is spent with the child on school related-
activities. I also include time spent as passive care towards education-related activity, such as, “sitting next
to the child while the child is involved in doing homework or reading.”23. Column 1 of Table 4.2 indicates
the negative effect of the substitution variable on time investment, that is, in the households where there is
child substitution, the mothers spend less time in the child’s education. Among the occupation categories,
mothers who are daily-wage earners spend more time helping their children with school- and study-related
activities as compared to other households, but not in a significant way.
A notable characteristic is, in the sample, about 54% of the mothers reported that they do not spend
any time helping the child with education-related activities. The effects of both the occupational identity
strength and binary identity variables are also negatively related to the time investment of the mother as
shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.2. The magnitude and sign of both substitution and identity binary
variables are of similar order in the one in which both variables are controlled as given in column 4. Although
the estimated coefficients of both identity and substitution variables are not significant for the quantitative
time investment measure, the finding that both occupation identity and child substitution result in decreased
monetary investments discussed above is intact for time investment as well. Among household characteristics,
both income and wealth have a positive impact. The mother’s age has a negative effect for time investment,
indicating younger mothers spend more time on their child’s education as compared to older mothers. The
only respondent characteristic that is statistically significant is the education level of the mothers. The
mother’s education has a positive impact, indicating more educated mothers spend more time helping their
children with study-related activities. The above result is consistent with the significant negative correlation
between mother’s education and age. The mothers of School 1 children invest significantly less time as
compared to mothers of School 2 children. A plausible reason is the average grade level of chosen students
from School 1 is 9.68 as opposed to 8.94 at School 2. The grade level and the time spent by mothers
are significantly negatively correlated. The difference in the mean time investment between the schools is
23American Time Use Survey.
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statistically significant at a 1% level.
The effect of the gender variable is negative, indicating male children receive less time investment. Al-
though the coefficient is not statistically significant, the result is consistent with the literature that child sex
affects parental investment. This supports that parents exhibit a pattern of favoritism towards the same sex
(Lilliard and Willis, 1994; Durante et al., 2017). Mothers spend significantly less time as the birth order of
the child goes up. Studies show that parental investment depends on the birth order of the child; Specifically
parents tend to favor the firstborns and last borns relative to middle borns (Salmon et al., 2011). Table A.4
presents the respective blockwise estimates. The negative impact becomes smaller when mother’s education
is controlled. With the school fixed effect, the magnitude of decrease becomes larger, which is reflected in the
negative and significant coefficient of School 1, indicating mothers of School 1 children spend significantly
less time helping their children with study-related activities as compared to mothers of School 2 children.
Table A.3 presents the blockwise estimates of occupational identity, and none of the blocks seem to change
the sign and magnitude of the negative effect of identity on time investment. Though I focus on substitution
and identity as the main coefficients, much of the findings on the household and child control variables of the
time investment specifications embrace the existing literature. Tables A.22 and A.23 presents the results of
these regressions under the two variations of mother’s education. The sign and significance of both identity
and substitution variables do not change under these both variations and consistent to results presented
in this chapter in Table 4.2, mother’s education measured in years is positive and significant at 1% level.
Among different categories of mother’s education, except for primary level, the remaining categories has
positive impact on time investment, especially, the mothers with high school level of education significantly
invests more time in child’s education.
4.2.2 Time Investment - Qualitative Measure
Table 4.3 shows the estimates of the qualitative time investment, which is a measure of parental involvement
in their child’s education in a socio-behavioral sense. The dependent variable is a Z-score measure of different
parent - child interconnections in school- and learning-related activities, such as how much does the parents
know about the child’s learning; whether the parent(s) attend meetings at the child’s school; and do parent-
child conversations involve the school and the child’s learning. Column 1 shows the impact of the substitution
variable and the coefficient is positive, indicating that mothers who have their children substitute for their
work are involved more in the child’s learning in a qualitative sense. The coefficient is not significant in a
statistical sense, but this is the only investment variable in which substitution has a positive effect. Among
households in which child substitution occurs, about 95% attended parent-teacher conferences as opposed to
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82% of households where there is no substitution. In addition, mothers whose children help them at work
can recall school-related conversations at a higher percentage compared to mothers whose children do not
substitute. Studies have noted increases in scientific thinking and higher test scores among children as a
result of more parent-child conversations (Callanan and Braswell, 2006 and Mantzicopoulos et al., 2011).
But the impact of socio-behavioral interactions between the parent and child on educational investments is
much less explored in the field of economics of education.
All occupation categories have positive Z-score values for the qualitative time investment except for
domestic workers. Notably, self-employed mothers spend less time helping their children with study-related
activities quantitatively as compared to other categories but more in a qualitative sense. Self-employment is
a leading occupation category to employ child labor in this sample, and that explains the positive coefficient
on child substitution. This is thought provoking in the sense that when the child helps, it also opens up the
possibility of more parent-child interactions and therefore increases the qualitative time involvement of the
parent. Both the identity strength and binary identity variables have negative coefficients, that is, mothers
who value occupation more as a factor towards their identity are less involved in their child’s education.
Particularly, the negative impact of binary occupational identity is significant at a 5% level. The mother’s
age has a negative impact for this measure of time investment, indicating that younger mothers know
more about their child’s education and learning as compared to older mothers. Also, the more-educated
mothers are involved more in their child’s learning compared with less-educated mothers, and the coefficient
is statistically significant. Both the income and wealth level have a positive impact, and the impact of the
wealth level is significant.
The coefficient on School 1 and gender are both negative, indicating mothers of School 1 children make
less qualitative time investment, and mothers of girls are involved more than mothers of boys. Both these
variables are significant, especially that School 1 is more significant for qualitative measure of time investment
than quantitative measure. From Table A.6, it is evident that the magnitude of the impact of substitution
is highly influenced by the household characteristics block. Table A.5 shows that sign and magnitude of
identity strength does not change when the controls are added in blocks; In other words, none of the blocks
seem to have a bigger effect on the coefficient of identity strength. The differential impact on both measures
of time investment ascertain the importance of different dimensions of qualitative and quantitative measures
of parental time investment in the child’s education. Tables A.24 and A.25 presents the results of these
regressions under the two variations of mother’s education. The education measured in years has the same
sign and significance as shown in Table 4.3 in this chapter. All categories of education has positive impact
on qualitative time investment. In specific, the mothers with elementary, upper-elementary, high school and
college levels of education significantly spend more qualitative time in child’s education. Further, the sign
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and significance of both identity and substitution variables do not change under these both variations.
4.3 Time Investment - Child
Table 4.4 reports the estimates for the regressions of time investment made by the chosen child in his/her
education. Column 1 shows that substitution has a negative effect on the time investment. The children
who help their parents at work spend less time in their school-related activities. Though the coefficient
does not have significance from a statistical point of view, the negative sign is crucial. Child labor laws in
India were amended in 2016 to allow school-going children to help with family enterprises after school. This
makes a strong case as to why the correlation between child labor, in which the child helps the parent, and
the time commitment of the child in study-related activities are important and should be understood well.
The identity strength variable of the mother has positive effect on the time spent by the child as given in
column 2. That is, the children of the mothers who keep the occupation factor for one more round of the
identity game tend to invest more time in their education. The coefficient of the binary identity variable,
which measures the impact of choosing occupation as the prime factor of identity relative to other factors,
also shows a positive effect on the time investment as shown in column 3. Though both coefficients are
not significant, this is the only investment that has a positive impact from mother’s occupational identity,
indicating children of such mothers invest more time in study-related activities.
Among mother’s characteristics, children of mothers who are older spend more time in study-related
activities and the coefficient is significant at a 1% level. Part of this effect can be explained by the grade
level of the children, which is significantly correlated with the time investment of the child. On average,
children at the grade levels 10 and above spend an hour more than the children in 6th to 9th grades, and the
children at higher grades have older mothers. The coefficient on income predicts negative effect on the time
investment of the child, indicating children of households with higher income level invests less time in their
education. The wealth level of households has positive and significant effect on the time investment of the
child in their education. The boys spend less time as compared to girls. Though on average, time investment
of children of School 1 is marginally more than the time spent by the children of School 2, when controlled
for gender along with the other covariates, the effect is negative. This could be because girls substitute
more in total sample and the children who substitute statistically invest less time as compared to children
who do not substitute. The coefficient on birth order shows significant effects, indicating that children of
higher birth order invest less time in their education. The block regression presented in Table A.8 shows the
coefficient of substitution changes by a larger magnitude with the gender and birth order inclusion. Table
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A.7 shows the change in the identity strength in the respective block regression. A simple regression of
occupation identity strength on the time investment of children shows negative effect, and the sign changes
when household characteristics are controlled. The positive impact of both mother’s age and education on
the children’s time commitment explains this. Tables A.26 and A.27 shows these regressions with mother’s
education measured in years and categories of education included as binary variables. Both variations of
education are not significant in determining the time investment of the child. Among categories, primary
and elementary levels have negative effect on the time investment of the child.
4.4 Other Regressions
In Table 4.5, I present additional specifications for time investment with chosen children’s identity variables
along with household characteristics and mother’s occupational identity. The sign of the substitution variable
does not change with the inclusion of the child’s binary occupational identity variable as given in column
6. Both the occupational identity strength and binary occupational identity of the chosen child predict a
positive effect on the time invested by the child, indicating that children who value the occupation factor
more towards their identity spend more time in study-related activities. Although that positive effect is not
significant, the sign itself should be taken seriously. The study by Akerlof and Kranton (2002) on identity and
schooling shows how incorporating the sociological perspectives of social categories can explain educational
outcomes that puzzle education economists. This positive association of occupation as identity with the
time allocation decisions of children can explain student behavior in a different perspective as compared to
standard education models. As shown in specifications 3 and 5 of Table 4.5, the sign of the child occupational
identity variable does not change when the mother’s occupational identity is included.
The sign and significance of the mother’s age, wealth level and birth order are all consistent with the
results presented in Table 4.4. Table A.10 shows the changes in substitution and the child’s binary identity
variable when controls are added as blocks. The change in magnitude of substitution with the inclusion of
gender and birth order is previously noted. In a similar way, the binary occupational identity variable for
the child changes when gender and birth order are included. Among girls, 66% chose occupation as their
prime identity as compared to 48% of boys. Table A.9 shows that the occupational identity strength is both
positive and significant for the time investment of the child until gender and birth order of the child are
included, indicating the negative relationship of both with respect to the identity choice of the children.
Table 4.6 presents the estimates of identity and substitution along with household and chosen child
characteristics on school performance. School performance measures the total points received by the chosen
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children in a recent exam, and the coefficients of the variables should be interpreted as the increase /decrease
in the total points received on the test in absolute sense. Substitution has a positive effect on school
performance. Table A.12, which considers the control variables in blocks, can shed more light on this.
The coefficient of substitution is negative until gender and birth order are included, both of which have
significant negative impacts on the total points. When the proportion of substitution is considered within
a given gender, boys substitute more than girls, and combined with the effect that boys earn many fewer
points than girls, the coefficient of substitution changes sign when gender is included. The birth order effect
is similar to gender, but the negative correlation with total points is in a smaller magnitude and significance
than in the case of gender. The children who valued occupation factor relatively more for the next round
in the game, significantly receive higher test scores as compared to children who deleted occupation in the
game more quickly.
Table A.11 shows that both the occupational identity strength and binary occupational identity of the
child is consistently positive and significant in all of the models. The inclusion of gender and birth order
reduces the significance from 1% to 5%. The children of mothers who valued occupation for one more
round in the game perform less at school. One possible explanation is that the total points and monetary
investment made by the households are positively correlated, and as previously noted, mothers who “value
occupation more” also invest less. The coefficient is significant at a 10% level. Both the age and the education
of the mother significantly increases the test scores. The children of households with higher wealth levels
perform significantly more. The occupational science study by Unruh (2004) claims “much of development
and maturation during adolescence and early adulthood is about constructing an occupational identity based
on achieving meaningful work”. Much of the productivity in individuals in general is driven by ambitions
and motivation. This school performance specification and the significant effect of how the child feels about
occupation on the test scores show that the above claim can be extended to the notion of productivity of
the school children and the importance of considering such variables in studying educational outcomes.
Finally, I turn to Tables 4.7-4.10, in which I repeat the specifications presented in Tables 4.1, 4.2 , 4.3 & 4.4
with the inclusion of behavioral variables such as role model choice of the mother; parental aspiration towards
the educational level of the child; and child motivation towards education to evaluate both the impact of these
behavioral variables on the educational investment levels and also whether the effect of either substitution
or identity change. Table 4.7 shows the effect on monetary investments. If mothers have their role model
due to the occupation factor, the monetary investment is more, but not in a statistically significant way.
Parental aspiration has the expected positive sign for monetary investments. Child motivation is measured
on a Likert scale and has a negative effect on monetary investments. The sign and significance of both
identity and substitution variables do not change in these specifications of behavioral variables.
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Table 4.8 present the estimates of behavioral variables on the quantitative time investment measure.
The circumstance where mothers have role models because of occupation trait has a positive impact on
quantitative time investment. The mothers with high aspirations for their children spend significantly more
time quantitatively. When behavioral variables are included, the sign of binary occupational identity for
quantitative time investment changes from negative to positive. A higher motivation score for the children
result in a higher investment of time by the mothers. Table 4.9 present the estimates for qualitative time
investments. The parental aspiration in consistent with the effect on quantitative measure continues to
be positive and significant for qualitative time investment as well. The behavior of both substitution and
identity variables do not change for qualitative time investments with the inclusion of behavioral variables.
Table 4.10 present the estimates for the time investment of the child. Among the three behavioral
variables, child motivation is significant at a 1% level in determining the time commitment of the children
in education-related activities. This result is in synthesis with sociology that translates to the economic
reasoning behind the investment decisions of parents. Motivation is recognized as the reason why individuals
makes a decision and have the strength to carry out the decisions made (Gorard et al., 2012).24 I also present
the blockwise regressions for the behavioral variables in the Appendix. In these block regressions, I consider
the behavioral variables as one block and show the effect of that block, that is, whether the coefficient
of behavioral variables change as other controls are added. Table A.13 shows that parental aspiration
is significant but when controlled for household and socioeconomic status and child characteristics, the
effect becomes small. Table A.14 shows the behavioral variables as a block is consistent with the sign and
significance in all the specifications. Table A.15 shows that mother spends more time qualitatively if she has
a role model due to an occupation factor, but the positive effect gets smaller when controlled for household,
socioeconomic and the child characteristics. This indicates the perception of mothers towards occupation
as a trait is influenced by other characteristics of the household. Table A.16 shows parental aspiration is
significant and a positive determinant of the time investment of the child in their education. But when
household and socioeconomic status and child characteristics are controlled, the effect becomes smaller and
insignificant.
4.5 Conclusion
In summary, the analysis in this chapter shows that mothers who value occupation more towards their
identity as opposed to mother tongue, relationship or birthplace invest less money and time on the chosen
child’s education. The households in which children help the parent at work, that is, in households where
24See Gorard et al., 2012 for a detailed review of causal links between attitudes and aspirations and educational attainment.
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this type of child labor prevail, invest less money and less quantitative time but more qualitative time in the
chosen child’s education. If occupational identity of the child is strong then the child invests more time in
his/her education and school performance is also higher. The other behavioral variables, such as parental
aspiration and child motivation do not impact the monetary investments but positively and significantly
increase the time investments of the child and mother in the child’s educational pursuits. Though I do not
present this analysis to capture the causal link of the variables of interest on investments, these results are
indicative of households which employs their own children and in which mothers perceive occupation as a
important component of their self-image invest differently. In future research, I intend to pursue this as an
in-depth study of a larger sample of households with more heterogeneity in occupations and school types.
Table 4.1: Models of Monetary Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Monetary Investments
Child Substitution (0/1) -1509.1+ -1410.7+
(805.4) (801.2)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -426.5∗
(179.6)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -976.8∗ -936.3∗
(419.8) (418.9)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -75.40 28.41 56.75 -56.45
(424.5) (418.2) (418.3) (421.8)
Mother’s Age 82.80∗ 82.91∗ 85.35∗ 83.00∗
(35.71) (35.57) (35.57) (35.47)
Mother’s Education -2.957 -23.12 -2.669 -17.15
(134.6) (134.8) (134.1) (133.9)
Total Income 69.57∗ 81.86∗ 78.44∗ 79.75∗
(32.82) (33.22) (33.02) (32.91)
Assets 296.7∗ 290.7∗ 284.9∗ 272.6∗
(134.8) (134.4) (134.6) (134.3)
School 1 -2714.1∗∗ -2593.2∗∗ -2548.9∗∗ -2612.4∗∗
(498.5) (496.2) (497.7) (497.2)
Gender 1226.1∗ 1156.8∗ 1238.5∗ 1262.1∗
(549.7) (547.8) (548.0) (546.2)
Birth Order -659.3∗ -759.4∗∗ -765.6∗∗ -703.5∗
(276.0) (273.3) (273.5) (274.9)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -235.2 -154.3 -136.6 -233.7
(418.6) (413.5) (413.6) (415.8)
Constant 5069.0∗∗ 6079.4∗∗ 5059.0∗∗ 5278.3∗∗
(1617.4) (1691.1) (1610.1) (1609.2)
R2 0.252 0.258 0.257 0.265
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.2: Models of Quantitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Quantitative Time Investment of Mother
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.0303 -0.0296
(0.144) (0.145)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0108
(0.0324)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.00708 -0.00619
(0.0758) (0.0760)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0637 0.0657 0.0662 0.0638
(0.0762) (0.0753) (0.0753) (0.0763)
Mother’s Age -0.00579 -0.00581 -0.00575 -0.00579
(0.00641) (0.00641) (0.00641) (0.00642)
Mother’s Education 0.0643∗∗ 0.0637∗∗ 0.0645∗∗ 0.0642∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0242)
Total Income 0.000397 0.000702 0.000428 0.000459
(0.00592) (0.00601) (0.00597) (0.00598)
Assets 0.0237 0.0234 0.0237 0.0235
(0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0243)
School 1 -0.227∗ -0.224∗ -0.225∗ -0.226∗
(0.0900) (0.0900) (0.0903) (0.0907)
Gender -0.128 -0.130 -0.128 -0.128
(0.0990) (0.0990) (0.0990) (0.0992)
Birth Order -0.0860+ -0.0881+ -0.0875+ -0.0862+
(0.0495) (0.0492) (0.0492) (0.0497)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0358 0.0374 0.0379 0.0358
(0.0752) (0.0745) (0.0745) (0.0753)
Constant 0.622∗ 0.649∗ 0.619∗ 0.623∗
(0.290) (0.305) (0.290) (0.291)
R2 .08 .08 .08 .08
N 304 304 304 304
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.3: Models of Qualitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Qualitative Time Investment of Mother Z score
Child Substitution (0/1) 0.200 0.224
(0.219) (0.218)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0623
(0.0489)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.225∗ -0.231∗
(0.114) (0.114)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0859 0.0675 0.0726 0.0906
(0.115) (0.114) (0.113) (0.115)
Mother’s Age -0.00547 -0.00615 -0.00579 -0.00542
(0.00970) (0.00969) (0.00965) (0.00965)
Mother’s Education 0.245∗∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.239∗∗ 0.242∗∗
(0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0364) (0.0364)
Total Income 0.00759 0.00991 0.0103 0.0101
(0.00892) (0.00905) (0.00896) (0.00896)
Assets 0.0699+ 0.0651+ 0.0620+ 0.0640+
(0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0365) (0.0366)
School 1 -0.411∗∗ -0.411∗∗ -0.396∗∗ -0.386∗∗
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
Gender -0.260+ -0.262+ -0.247+ -0.251+
(0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149)
Birth Order 0.0107 0.0141 0.00965 -0.000234
(0.0750) (0.0744) (0.0742) (0.0748)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0695 -0.0867 -0.0846 -0.0691
(0.114) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113)
Constant -0.580 -0.364 -0.494 -0.529
(0.439) (0.461) (0.437) (0.438)
R2 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.4: Models of Time Investment by the Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Time Investment of Child
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.379 -0.385
(0.352) (0.353)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother 0.00721
(0.0790)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.0402 0.0513
(0.185) (0.185)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0228 0.0533 0.0526 0.0217
(0.186) (0.184) (0.184) (0.186)
Mother’s Age 0.0538∗∗ 0.0544∗∗ 0.0544∗∗ 0.0538∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0157)
Mother’s Education 0.0000715 0.00475 0.00480 0.000849
(0.0589) (0.0593) (0.0590) (0.0591)
Total Income -0.00743 -0.00814 -0.00834 -0.00798
(0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0145)
Assets 0.112+ 0.116+ 0.116+ 0.113+
(0.0590) (0.0591) (0.0592) (0.0593)
School 1 -0.0215 -0.00653 -0.00975 -0.0271
(0.218) (0.218) (0.219) (0.219)
Gender -0.208 -0.214 -0.216 -0.210
(0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241)
Birth Order -0.426∗∗ -0.442∗∗ -0.440∗∗ -0.423∗∗
(0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0231 0.0496 0.0495 0.0230
(0.183) (0.182) (0.182) (0.183)
Constant 9.931∗∗ 9.848∗∗ 9.859∗∗ 9.919∗∗
(0.708) (0.744) (0.708) (0.710)
R2 .08 .08 .08 .08
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: Impact of Child Identity on Time Investment by the Child
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Time Investment of Child
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.379 -0.388
(0.352) (0.354)
Occupational Identity Strength of Child 0.117 0.117
(0.0960) (0.0964)
Occupational Identity of Child (0/1) 0.0739 0.0713 0.0759
(0.178) (0.179) (0.179)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother 0.000209
(0.0792)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.0344 0.0451
(0.185) (0.186)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0228 0.0405 0.0405 0.0514 0.0510 0.0198
(0.186) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.186)
Mother’s Age 0.0538∗∗ 0.0534∗∗ 0.0534∗∗ 0.0541∗∗ 0.0541∗∗ 0.0535∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157)
Mother’s Education 0.0000715 0.00497 0.00498 0.00457 0.00511 0.00115
(0.0589) (0.0588) (0.0592) (0.0589) (0.0591) (0.0592)
Total Income -0.00743 -0.00794 -0.00795 -0.00777 -0.00816 -0.00778
(0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0145)
Assets 0.112+ 0.111+ 0.112+ 0.114+ 0.115+ 0.111+
(0.0590) (0.0589) (0.0592) (0.0591) (0.0594) (0.0595)
School 1 -0.0215 -0.00905 -0.00908 -0.00178 -0.00550 -0.0227
(0.218) (0.218) (0.218) (0.218) (0.219) (0.220)
Gender -0.208 -0.173 -0.173 -0.197 -0.199 -0.191
(0.241) (0.243) (0.243) (0.245) (0.245) (0.245)
Birth Order -0.426∗∗ -0.424∗∗ -0.424∗∗ -0.436∗∗ -0.435∗∗ -0.418∗∗
(0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.122)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0231 0.0331 0.0331 0.0432 0.0436 0.0165
(0.183) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.183) (0.184)
Constant 9.931∗∗ 9.481∗∗ 9.480∗∗ 9.818∗∗ 9.811∗∗ 9.869∗∗
(0.708) (0.773) (0.802) (0.717) (0.719) (0.721)
R2 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08
N 305 305 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: Models of School Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Total Points
Child Substitution (0/1) 10.16 10.98
(20.89) (20.75)
Occupational Identity Strength of Child 12.92∗
(5.668)
Occupational Identity of Child (0/1) 22.35∗ 22.23∗
(10.52) (10.54)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -4.008
(4.657)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -18.92+ -19.23+
(10.85) (10.88)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 6.407 7.221 4.901 6.170 7.056
(10.88) (11.02) (10.83) (10.79) (10.93)
Mother’s Age 3.563∗∗ 3.580∗∗ 3.434∗∗ 3.489∗∗ 3.508∗∗
(0.926) (0.928) (0.922) (0.919) (0.921)
Mother’s Education 8.600∗ 8.709∗ 8.342∗ 8.412∗ 8.523∗
(3.482) (3.494) (3.483) (3.457) (3.468)
Total Income -0.388 -0.400 -0.248 -0.126 -0.136
(0.859) (0.860) (0.868) (0.860) (0.862)
Assets 9.662∗∗ 9.759∗∗ 9.038∗∗ 8.698∗ 8.797∗
(3.488) (3.498) (3.480) (3.479) (3.488)
School 1 2.499 2.922 2.564 5.489 5.973
(12.92) (12.97) (12.85) (12.87) (12.92)
Gender -37.32∗∗ -37.51∗∗ -33.18∗ -31.22∗ -31.44∗
(14.24) (14.26) (14.29) (14.35) (14.38)
Birth Order -23.13∗∗ -23.57∗∗ -21.49∗∗ -22.19∗∗ -22.68∗∗
(7.097) (7.162) (7.114) (7.095) (7.165)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.278 0.975 -1.814 -1.777 -1.014
(10.79) (10.90) (10.76) (10.74) (10.85)
Constant 146.4∗∗ 144.7∗∗ 115.3∗ 135.2∗∗ 133.6∗∗
(41.85) (42.05) (47.24) (42.22) (42.38)
R2 .14 .14 .16 .16 .16
N 304 304 304 304 304
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Impact of Behavioral Variables on Monetary Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Monetary Investments
Parental Aspiration 480.6 487.2 406.1 435.5
(476.5) (474.6) (475.3) (473.6)
Child Motivation -282.3 -309.8 -294.7 -294.3
(188.6) (188.2) (188.2) (187.4)
Role Model of Mother due to Occupation 265.2 50.54 69.26 244.3
(610.7) (600.9) (601.5) (606.6)
Child Substitution (0/1) -1598.5+ -1493.8+
(815.5) (811.3)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -447.0∗
(179.9)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -982.7∗ -938.2∗
(420.4) (419.4)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -120.7 -15.63 23.70 -95.27
(429.1) (422.6) (423.1) (426.3)
Mother’s Age 79.60∗ 79.46∗ 82.69∗ 80.18∗
(35.92) (35.77) (35.80) (35.68)
Mother’s Education -29.31 -44.51 -18.65 -39.96
(138.5) (138.3) (137.7) (137.6)
Total Income 68.97∗ 82.66∗ 78.83∗ 79.54∗
(32.95) (33.37) (33.20) (33.07)
Assets 285.7∗ 281.1∗ 278.6∗ 263.7+
(136.0) (135.5) (135.7) (135.4)
School 1 -2580.6∗∗ -2444.5∗∗ -2416.1∗∗ -2480.2∗∗
(504.9) (502.8) (504.4) (503.5)
Gender 1294.8∗ 1208.8∗ 1289.1∗ 1328.3∗
(552.2) (549.8) (550.5) (548.7)
Birth Order -669.3∗ -778.1∗∗ -784.5∗∗ -717.2∗∗
(277.5) (274.6) (275.1) (276.4)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -149.2 -64.79 -57.01 -152.1
(423.0) (418.2) (418.6) (420.1)
Constant 6810.2∗ 8162.4∗∗ 7137.4∗ 7271.2∗∗
(2789.4) (2843.7) (2788.5) (2778.1)
R2 .26 .27 .27 .27
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.8: Impact of Behavioral Variables on Quantitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Quantitative Time Investment of Mother
Parental Aspiration 0.267∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.268∗∗
(0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0837) (0.0839)
Child Motivation 0.0724∗ 0.0717∗ 0.0725∗ 0.0725∗
(0.0331) (0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0332)
Role Model of Mother due to Occupation (0/1) 0.0106 0.00448 0.00563 0.0110
(0.108) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108)
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.0427 -0.0438
(0.143) (0.143)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.00971
(0.0317)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.00818 0.00958
(0.0741) (0.0744)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0244 0.0274 0.0277 0.0242
(0.0752) (0.0743) (0.0744) (0.0754)
Mother’s Age -0.00823 -0.00824 -0.00817 -0.00823
(0.00631) (0.00631) (0.00631) (0.00632)
Mother’s Education 0.0459+ 0.0457+ 0.0467+ 0.0461+
(0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0242) (0.0243)
Total Income -0.00156 -0.00129 -0.00169 -0.00166
(0.00581) (0.00590) (0.00586) (0.00587)
Assets 0.0116 0.0116 0.0123 0.0119
(0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0240)
School 1 -0.216∗ -0.212∗ -0.215∗ -0.217∗
(0.0893) (0.0893) (0.0896) (0.0900)
Gender -0.121 -0.122 -0.122 -0.121
(0.0971) (0.0971) (0.0971) (0.0974)
Birth Order -0.0652 -0.0678 -0.0667 -0.0647
(0.0486) (0.0483) (0.0484) (0.0489)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0620 0.0645 0.0648 0.0619
(0.0743) (0.0737) (0.0738) (0.0745)
Constant -0.878+ -0.849+ -0.886+ -0.883+
(0.489) (0.501) (0.490) (0.491)
R2 .13 .13 .13 .13
N 304 304 304 304
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.9: Impact of Behavioral Variables on Qualitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables: Qualitative Time Investment of Mother Z score
Parental Aspiration 0.360∗∗ 0.368∗∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.350∗∗
(0.128) (0.128) (0.127) (0.128)
Child Motivation 0.0423 0.0384 0.0396 0.0396
(0.0507) (0.0507) (0.0505) (0.0505)
Role Model of Mother due to Occupation (0/1) 0.145 0.159 0.161 0.140
(0.164) (0.162) (0.161) (0.163)
Child Substitution (0/1) 0.153 0.177
(0.219) (0.219)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0629
(0.0484)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.208+ -0.213+
(0.113) (0.113)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0369 0.0218 0.0286 0.0427
(0.115) (0.114) (0.113) (0.115)
Mother’s Age -0.00845 -0.00910 -0.00861 -0.00831
(0.00965) (0.00963) (0.00960) (0.00961)
Mother’s Education 0.219∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.216∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0369) (0.0371)
Total Income 0.00518 0.00741 0.00766 0.00758
(0.00885) (0.00898) (0.00890) (0.00891)
Assets 0.0547 0.0500 0.0479 0.0497
(0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0364) (0.0365)
School 1 -0.383∗∗ -0.379∗∗ -0.368∗∗ -0.360∗∗
(0.136) (0.135) (0.135) (0.136)
Gender -0.236 -0.238 -0.224 -0.228
(0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148)
Birth Order 0.0329 0.0341 0.0300 0.0221
(0.0746) (0.0739) (0.0738) (0.0745)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0289 -0.0412 -0.0408 -0.0295
(0.114) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113)
Constant -2.014∗∗ -1.784∗ -1.893∗ -1.909∗
(0.749) (0.766) (0.748) (0.748)
R2 .22 .22 .22 .23
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
61
Table 4.10: Impact of Behavioral Variables on Time Investment by the Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables: Time Investment of Child
Parental Aspiration 0.253 0.244 0.249 0.256
(0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205)
Child Motivation 0.271∗∗ 0.272∗∗ 0.272∗∗ 0.272∗∗
(0.0811) (0.0814) (0.0812) (0.0812)
Role Model of Mother due to Occupation (0/1) -0.0160 -0.0590 -0.0596 -0.0142
(0.262) (0.260) (0.260) (0.263)
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.378 -0.388
(0.350) (0.352)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother 0.0191
(0.0777)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.0703 0.0819
(0.181) (0.182)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0265 0.00434 0.00214 -0.0287
(0.184) (0.183) (0.183) (0.185)
Mother’s Age 0.0511∗∗ 0.0518∗∗ 0.0517∗∗ 0.0510∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155)
Mother’s Education -0.0228 -0.0156 -0.0163 -0.0218
(0.0595) (0.0598) (0.0594) (0.0596)
Total Income -0.0108 -0.0117 -0.0119 -0.0117
(0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Assets 0.0948 0.0998+ 0.101+ 0.0967
(0.0584) (0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0587)
School 1 -0.0706 -0.0586 -0.0627 -0.0794
(0.217) (0.217) (0.218) (0.218)
Gender -0.223 -0.232 -0.236 -0.226
(0.237) (0.238) (0.238) (0.238)
Birth Order -0.383∗∗ -0.397∗∗ -0.396∗∗ -0.378∗∗
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.120)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0283 0.0533 0.0533 0.0286
(0.182) (0.181) (0.181) (0.182)
Constant 6.327∗∗ 6.222∗∗ 6.252∗∗ 6.286∗∗
(1.199) (1.229) (1.204) (1.204)
R2 .12 .12 .12 .13
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses




This dissertation presents a different view of how low-income households engaged in certain occupations
make educational investments for their children. In particular, contrary to the educational investments
literature, I shift focus to the behavioral aspects: “occupational identity”, that is, does occupation matter for
self-image/identity for parents in certain occupations; and “child labor substitution,” that is, do the children
of these parents help them at work and establish a link between the exogenous variation in identity and
substitutability choices and parental educational investment decisions. This focus is new and important not
just because educational investments are costly for such low-income households and they yield returns much
later, but also because this focus provides a channel to understand how optimization of investment decisions
of parents in certain occupations can be uniquely affected.
5.1 Determinants of Occupational Identity of Mother
The results presented in the previous chapter show that the two identity variables, that is, i) occupational
identity strength (which measures the relative importance of occupation as compared to the other factors:
mother tongue, relationship or birthplace) and ii) binary occupational identity (which measures if occupation
is chosen as a main factor to represent identity) negatively affect the monetary and time investments made
by households. The one exception is that the time investment made by the child is positively affected by
the mother’s occupational identity strength. Notably, the coefficients of the identity variables are significant
in determining the monetary investments and qualitative time investment of the household, indicating that
the households in which mothers value occupation more invest less in the children’s education. We could ask
why the investment levels are not more if the parent chooses occupation as a prime factor of her identity?
To explore this question further, I examine several mechanisms behind the choice of occupation to represent
identity. These mechanisms include: i) studying the pattern of elimination of occupation in the identity
game between working and non-working mothers; ii) examining the relevance of occupation in one’s identity
formation; iii) exploring the determinants of occupational identity.
About 75% of the mothers in the sample of 305 households are employed. Among the mothers who chose
occupation as a primary factor of identity, 83% represent working mothers and 17% are non-working, and
the difference in the occupational identity strength between working and non-working mothers is significant
at a 1% level. This higher choice of occupation as a factor towards identity by the cohort of working mothers
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in the overall sample supports the claim of the occupational identity literature that occupations are central
“not just to being a person, but being a particular person and thus, creating and maintaining an identity“
(Christiansen, 1999). At the same time, the percentage distribution of the identity choice of occupation
within the employed cohort shows that 16% of employed mothers eliminated occupation in the first round,
25% in the second round and 43% in the final round of the game; This indicates that 146 employed mothers
out of the total employed of 228 mothers did not value occupation as a primary factor of their identity and
this observation warrants attention.
The occupational identity literature reveals “choice” to be one of the theoretical assumptions behind the
construct of occupational identity (Christiansen, 1999; Phelan and Kinsella, 2009). According to this, occu-
pation becomes a unique identity “when it is chosen, controlled and goal directed.” Though the occupational
identity literature acknowledges the role of culture, values, socioeconomic conditions and other obligations in
the occupation an individual assumes, these factors are less explored in the construct of occupational iden-
tity. So it is plausible that occupations such as daily-wage work, domestic work and small self-employment
represented by the sample of this study may have been circumstantial for these households and not a result
of a choice-making process. This “circumstantial” characteristic of these occupations could then mean that
the 36% of employed mothers that opted for occupation as their primary choice of identity is not due to the
importance they place on their occupation but because of deprived opportunities towards that choice.
The notion of occupational identity is less explored in economics, and how behavioral aspects of the
poor affect their decision-making are even less addressed in the development literature. The negative impact
produced by occupational identity on educational investment decisions prompts the examination of the
determinants of occupational identity. I describe such determinants here in a way to understand the nature
of its endogenous formation and do not intend to establish causality. Table 5.1 presents such effects through
simple regressions on the occupational identity strength of the mother. The mothers who are in occupations
that are highly substitutable value occupation relatively more as compared to mother tongue, relationship
or birthplace as presented in the identity game. The correlation between the substitutability attribute of
occupation and occupational identity strength is positive and significant at a 5% level. In the sample,
96% of mothers in daily-wage occupations responded that occupation is substitutable followed by 90% of
domestic workers, 80% of private and government employed and 38% of self-employed. The significance of all
occupations on identity strength shows that occupation is a stronger factor for the employed compared to the
unemployed. In particular, occupational identity strength is significantly stronger for domestic workers as
that occupation category represent the highest percentage (43%) to choose occupation as their primary factor
of identity. The high substitutability attribute of that occupation (90% of domestic workers responded that
their occupation is substitutable) is consistent with the observation that substitutability of an occupation
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drives the construct of occupational identity among low-income occupations. Further, the mothers are more
likely to choose occupation as identity if in her occupation she has observed her coworkers bringing their
children to help at work as shown by the variable “Substitution Common-Mother’s Occupation”.
The mothers of households in which children substitute for the parent(s) at work have higher occupational
identity strength. Though the coefficient of child substitution is not significant, the positive sign is important.
This collectively adds evidence to the observation that substitutable attribute of the occupation make it a
strong factor towards identity among the employed. The higher the income, the higher the identity strength.
The wealth level is negatively related to occupational identity. The identity strength is higher for mothers
whose children go to School 1, which also has marginally higher amounts of employed mothers as compared
to School 2. The child’s occupational identity positively affects the mother’s occupational identity strength.
The mothers who have high hopes for their children’s future educational attainment have higher occupational
identity strength. While some of the coefficients are not significant from a regression point of view, the focus
of this exercise is to understand the factors that contribute to the construct of occupational identity.
5.2 Determinants of Chosen Child’s Occupational Identity
The number of children who chose occupation as primary identity is almost double in number as compared
to the mothers. In the sample of 305 households, a total of 187 children chose occupation as identity as
opposed to 99 mothers. Table 5.2 presents the estimates of simple regressions of determinants of occupational
identity strength of the child. Among the children of employed mothers, children of domestic workers
chose occupation as their prime identity at a higher rate as compared to the children of mothers at other
occupations. The school performance of the chosen children as measured by the total points received in the
recent exam has significant and positive effect on occupational identity. About 66% of the children who chose
occupation as their identity are girls, which is indicated by the negative coefficient of gender and the effect
is significant. The children who substitute for parents labor value occupation less as a factor towards their
self-image, especially, as the frequency of substitution goes up as measured by “child substitution frequency,”
the children are less likely to value occupation more. The children with high motivation score have higher
occupational identity strength. There is a small positive correlation between mother’s occupational identity
and the child’s occupational identity.
65
5.3 Determinants of Child Substitution
The other main finding of the study is that how a particular form of child labor in which children substitute
for their parent’s labor at work can prevail in some low-income occupations and how educational investments
can vary in the presence of such child substitution of labor. An ILO report based on national household
surveys of South Asian countries finds that child labor for the age group of 5-17- year-old is highest in India
in absolute terms of 5.8 million children.25 The report identifies that 43% of 7-17-year-olds are engaged in
unpaid family work. Further, .3% of 7-14-year-olds and 1.7% of 15-17-year-olds are reported to be both
in school and employed. The child labor include children involved in hazardous occupations, and/or non-
hazardous occupations but engaged for longer hours (more than 43 hours in the given reference week),
and/or children who are below minimum age. According to international standards and also in the context
of Indian Child Labour Law (amended in 2016), the children are thus allowed to be engaged in light work
in non-hazardous occupations after school. Though the laws recognize that light work should not interfere
with child’s education, it is difficult to verify without data driven evidence that this is infact the case given
this sort of labor is highly likely in family run enterprises/when parents are self-employed. The form of
child labor addressed in this study – school-going children help their parents at work– needs careful analysis
especially because from a development context where marginalized groups of people are often the study of
interest and occupations where this type of child labor are commonly prevalent (such as domestic work,
daily-wage work and small self-employment) are highly represented among those marginalized groups.
In my sample, the households in which children substitute for their parents labor invest less money and
time in their children’s education. In particular, monetary investments are significantly less. The children
who help the parent(s) at work spend significantly less time in school-and study related activities. The
mother is involved more in a qualitative sense in the presence of child substitution. Table 5.3 presents
simple regressions of the determinants of child substitution. Among occupation categories of mother and
father, child substitution is highest for the self-employed. Substitution is the second highest for mothers
that do domestic work for employment. The households with lower wealth levels and lower total income also
substitute more. Since the focus is to study the difference in investments in households with substitution
against households with no such child labor substitution, I define child substitution as a consolidated measure
of both substitution for mother and father’s work. In absolute terms, among the households where there is
such substitution, in 60% of households the child substitutes for the mother alone, in 20% of households the
child substitutes for the father alone and the remaining 20%, the substitution happens for both the mother
and father. In all three categories, the self-employment occupation dominates in using their own child labor
25Khan and Lyon, “Measuring Children’s Work in South Asia”, International Labour Organization, 2015.
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followed by domestic workers and daily-wage earners.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the estimates of simple regressions of the substitution for mother and father
separately. The dependent variable measures the frequency of substitution for mother and father, respec-
tively. The substitutable attribute of the mother and father’s occupation result in the positive relationship
with the frequency of substitution. The coefficients are not significant, but the positive sign show that the
substitutable nature of the parents occupation can trigger child labor. Both the familiarity the child has in
doing the mother’s and father’s work as captured by the variable “child knows how to do father’s/mother’s
work” and whether the earnings potential will go up if the child helps are highly significant in determining
substitution. The child substitution for mother is more in the households in which mother had worked as a
child, either for pay or helping her parents.
The effect of gender of the child on substitution is not significant. Overall, among the children who helped
the parent, 65% are girls and 35% are boys. But since in the total sample, girls (225 in sample) outweigh boys
(80 in sample) considerably, the proportion of substitution among girls is 6% as compared to 9% among the
total number of boys. This explains the small positive coefficient of gender on the substitution regressions.
The difference in substitution between genders in either the whole sample, which includes the two schools,
or within just School 2, which has both boys and girls is not statistically significant. The substitution for
mother is significantly influenced by “Substitution Common-Mother’s Occupation,” which captures whether
it is common in the mother’s occupation to bring the child to help at work. The occupational identity
strength of the mother has positive impact on the substitution. This indicates that the substitutability and
occupational identity are intertwined.
In summary, substitution is high in households engaged in self-employed/family enterprises occupation
category. Lower income and wealth contribute to the decision to employ one’s own child. Finally, collecting
data on a school-going children that help parents at work through surveys is difficult as the numbers are
often under-reported due to social disapproval of child labor. The incidence of this form of labor established
in the dissertation could be high because of this possibility of under-reporting. There are 69 households
engaged in self-employed, and 22% of those reported child labor. Given that self-employed is the leading
category employing child labor, the conjecture of under-reporting is reasonable. This can be further argued
from the perspective of the amendment of the Indian Child Labor law in 2016 that allows children to work
in family enterprises after school. These provisions as noted earlier, allow children to be engaged in light
market work in a way it does not affect attendance at school-and study related activities. But without
knowing the implications of light work on the time spent by children on studies, it is not possible to conclude
that this type of labor is not harmful. Hence including various types of survey questions at the national
and international level on all child labor that targets this specific type of labor in which children help their
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parents —which could otherwise be deemed as light work— is crucial to understand the cohort of children
who work and go to school.
The main finding of the study that occupational identity and the child substituting for parent’s work
affects the educational investments in a unique way matters substantially. The simple regressions presented
in this chapter provide support for the interdependency of substitutability and occupational identity. The
variations in educational investments due to occupational identity and a specific form of child labor as a
subject matter becomes highly important for developing countries due to the high incidence of child labor
and school drop-out rates. But this finding is not just relevant to developing countries. The Gallup Work
and Education Poll of the US (2014)26 identifies that 55% of US workers get their sense of identity from
their jobs, and this identity formation is strong among high-income individuals and college graduates. Thus,
both concepts I measure and empirically verify — “occupational identity and child labor substitution” may
very well translate to other developing and developed countries settings, while not in an exact magnitude,
sign, or significance.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.3: Determinants of Child Substitution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Child Substitution (0/1)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0344
(0.0339)
Whether Mother is a Domestic Worker (0/1) 0.0231
(0.0447)
Whether Mother is Self-Employed (0/1) 0.292∗∗
(0.0483)
Whether Mother is a Private/Government Worker (0/1) -0.0519
(0.0444)
Whether Mother is an Agriculutural Worker (0/1) -0.0519
(0.231)
Whether Father is a Private/Government Worker (0/1) -0.0147
(0.0534)
Whether Father is Self-Employed (0/1) 0.130∗
(0.0523)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0187
(0.0448)










Constant 0.0519∗ 0.0556 0.0656∗∗ 0.0788∗ 0.0578∗∗ 0.0784∗∗
(0.0262) (0.0405) (0.0142) (0.0344) (0.0165) (0.0201)
N 305 305 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses



























































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.5: Determinants of Frequency of Child Substitution for Father’s Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV : Frequency of Child Substitution
Whether Father’s Occupation is Substitutable (0/1) 0.00214
(0.0340)
Whether Chosen Child Knows to do Father’s Work (0/1) 1.227∗∗
(0.0505)




Constant 0.0429 7.08e-16 0.0254+ 0.0400∗
(0.0276) (0.00958) (0.0153) (0.0188)
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER 6
6 THE ROLE OF BELIEFS AND DISSONANCE IN MONETARY
AND TIME INVESTMENTS
6.1 Introduction
In the earlier chapters, I address how low-income households can make both monetary and time investments
in their children’s education. Specifically, I discussed how child labor substitution, that is, households in
which children help their parents at work and households in which mothers feel strongly about occupation
as a component of their identity are indicative of different levels of educational investments made by the
household. I further documented in earlier chapters how household characteristics of income and assets,
mother’s age, education, and chosen child characteristics of school, birth order and gender can stimulate
such investments. In this chapter I discuss how parent and child’s beliefs about returns to education can
be of vital importance towards the investment decisions of the household. Specifically, I show the role
of divergence in parent and child’s beliefs on the monetary and time investments by the household. The
question of effect of divergence in beliefs within a household on a household’s investment decisions is unique
as most of the studies in economics of education commonly address either the mismatch of the household’s
beliefs and actual returns or the inefficiency that may arise due to the household’s lacking information.
For this purpose, first, I ask in both the parent and child surveys about the type of job and their perceived
earnings for an individual under different levels of educational attainment. Second, I show that the effects of
occupational identity and child labor substitution on investments shown earlier do not change by controlling
for mothers beliefs regarding marginal returns to college. I find the mother’s beliefs to have a positive
relationship with both monetary and time investments and, specifically, the mother’s beliefs is significant
for the quantitative time investment made by the mother. Third, I show how divergence in beliefs between
mother and child can be indicative of the investment decisions of the household. I construct two measures
of dissonance to capture this divergence: i) difference between mother’s perceived earnings from college
education and the respective child’s perceived earnings; ii) difference between mother’s perceived gain in
earnings from increase in education from high school to college and the child’s perceived gain in earnings for
a similar increase. The former measure captures the dissonance in perceived total returns for college level
of education and the latter is the dissonance in marginal returns for college. I then specify the direction
of dissonance by defining positive dissonance if the mother’s value of beliefs (henceforth higher beliefs) is
higher than the child’s and negative if child’s beliefs are higher. The households in which mothers have
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higher beliefs to college significantly invests more time in a child’s education and the households in which
children have higher beliefs in marginal returns to college invests significantly more time in their education.
Finally, I discuss the characteristics of household, mother and child that are likely to lead to this positive or
negative dissonance.
This topic relates to many strands of literature in economics of education and psychology. The miscon-
ception of information of costs, benefits and risks in economic behavior is widely addressed by many studies
(Stango and Zinman, 2007; Chan and Stevens, 2008). Studies have also addressed how providing information
to individuals can alter their choices in savings, school and health (Duflo and Saez, 2003; Hastings and We-
instein, 2008; Dupas, 2009). The studies by Nguyen (2008) and Jensen (2010) show the mismatch between
perceived returns and actual returns and how providing information on those can improve the schooling
outcomes. More recently, Dizon-Ross (2019) shows how information frictions are high among poor parents
and providing information on performance of children to such parents enables them to update their beliefs
and can significantly increase the educational inputs of the household. Attanasio et al., (2019) show how par-
ents perceive the returns to educational investments of time, money and school quality and whether parents
regard these various investment types as substitutes or complements. While these studies addresses the gap
between a household’s perceived returns and actual returns and how freely available information may not
be fully comprehended in the household’s decision-making, the possibility of friction within the household is
less explored in the literature.
This study contributes a different viewpoint to the beliefs literature by emphasizing the correlation
between friction in beliefs within the household and the educational inputs choices of the household. In this
chapter, in addition to the effect of beliefs on educational investments, I also study the beliefs divergence
between mother and child. Golman et al., (2016) point how little attention in economics has been given
to preference for belief consonance. In their review, they quote the application of cognitive dissonance in
economics (originally by Leon Fistinger) by Akerlof and Dickens (1982). These psychological ideas show
the effect and importance of conflict in various beliefs within oneself and/or with a group. I extend this
conflict to a particular setting of dissonance in beliefs regarding returns on education between parent and
child. The literature on beliefs, especially that concerning schooling and parents’ educational investment
decisions, have widely addressed the effect of misalignment between perceived returns and actual returns on
the households’ decisions of educational inputs and schooling outcomes of the children. But in the households
of school-going children, the existence of two beliefs – parent and child – and the effect of conflict in such
beliefs in parents’ investment decisions is not studied. Further, the correlation between a certain direction
of conflict and investment decisions is important to identify any inefficiency in the household investments.
This will provide a new channel of thought that can lead to interventions in a way to create nudges for the
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investments.
Further, this chapter relates to the literature that combines psychological components of identity and
beliefs (Benabou and Tirole, 2016). I show positive dissonance is more likely in the households where mothers
and children chose occupation to represent their identity. The descriptive results of this chapter that connect
the occupational identity, beliefs and dissonance indicate the possibilities of reasoning based on motivated
beliefs. Golman et.al., (2016) discuss in their paper that the difference in beliefs between individuals and
groups can be extended to similar differences in values and attitudes one possesses. The relationship of
occupational identity of mothers and children to positive dissonance in the household shows the relationship
between the pattern of preference of identity choice and values of beliefs. This can lead to a new avenue of
research that combines beliefs and occupational identity. Thus, this chapter not only contributes to the role
of beliefs in educational investments decisions of households but also leads to novel perspectives of dissonance
in beliefs on the investment decisions of low-income parents.
6.2 Summary Statistics
The parent and child surveys included questions to the respondents on perceived returns to education of
an individual for four levels of educational attainment. The exact survey question is the following: “What
type of job would one get at the age of 25 for the following levels of education? What are the predicted
monthly earnings?”. The question is repeated for the four levels of education: i) No Primary; ii) Elementary;
iii) High School; and iv) College. The choices for job categories are domestic work, private, government,
self-employed, daily-wages and agriculture. The mothers’ top choices of jobs for no primary and elementary
levels of educational attainment are daily-wages and domestic work. For a high school level of education,
the top choices are private and daily-wages and for college almost all choices are for private and government
job categories. The children had a similar pattern of job choices. Tables 6a and 6b present the average of
predicted earnings reported by mother and chosen child for different levels of education. The unemployed
mothers have the highest beliefs for all categories of education. The children of self-employed mothers have
the highest beliefs for all categories except for elementary level of education, for which, the children of
unemployed mothers have the highest beliefs. I define the “beliefs for total returns” as the predicted earnings
for the college level of education and the “beliefs for marginal returns” to be the difference between the
predicted earnings for college and high school, that is, the marginal returns will measure the beliefs for gain
from increase in education. I chose college level of education attainment to define total returns as 79% of
the mothers in the sample had responded that they aspire their children to finish college. The correlation of
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beliefs for both the total returns and marginal returns between mother and child is positive and significant.
The mothers of School 2 children have significantly higher beliefs for both total and marginal returns
as compared to the mothers of School 1 children, and similarly School 2 children have significantly higher
beliefs as compared to School 1 children. Within School 2, there is no significant difference in beliefs between
gender. The mothers for whom occupation mattered the most towards their self-image have higher beliefs
for both total and marginal returns. Especially the difference in beliefs for marginal returns is statistically
significant between mothers who chose occupation as a primary factor to represent identity and mothers
who chose other factors. The children who chose occupation to represent their identity had higher beliefs
for marginal returns but the difference is not statistically significant when compared to children who chose
other factors. The mothers of households in which children substitute for their parents at work have higher
beliefs for both total and marginal returns as compared to mothers of households where there is no such
substitution.
Table 6a: Distribution of Beliefs to Returns to Education of Mothers
No Primary Elementary High School College
Domestic Work (in Rs) 5473 6823 9900 18700
Private/Government (in Rs) 7829 7805 9902 15854
Self-Employed (in Rs) 5859 7266 10125 19813
Daily-Wages (in Rs) 7218 8125 11421 19746
Agriculture (in Rs) 5000 5000 8000 12000
Unemployed (in Rs) 7935 8604 11494 20403
Notes: Data Source is the Household Parent Survey. The values represent the average predicted earnings for the
corresponding level of education.
Table 6b: Distribution of Beliefs to Returns to Education of Chosen Children
No Primary Elementary High School College
Domestic Work (in Rs) 5013 6363 10325 19250
Private/Government (in Rs) 5598 6537 10427 17146
Self-Employed (in Rs) 20516 6781 11844 22250
Daily-Wages (in Rs) 5591 6715 10597 20386
Agriculture (in Rs) 2000 2000 10000 15000
Unemployed (in Rs) 5701 6968 10195 20961
Notes: Data Source is the Household Child Survey. The values represent the average predicted earnings for the corresponding
level of education.
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6.3 Dissonance in Beliefs
In this chapter, in addition to the effect of beliefs on educational investments, I also present the analysis
of dissonance in beliefs between parent and child on the investment decisions of the household. To study
the effect of dissonance, I define two measures of dissonance in beliefs: i) difference in beliefs for the total
returns; and ii) difference in beliefs for the marginal returns. The dissonance in total returns measures
the difference in mother and child’s perceived earnings for the college level of education. The dissonance
in marginal returns measures the difference in perceived marginal earnings to college between mother and
child. Table 6c presents the summary statistics of the two measures of dissonance. The divergence in beliefs
is small for both measures of dissonance for households in which mothers chose occupation to represent their
identity. For children for whom the occupation mattered the most, the dissonance in total returns is small
and the dissonance in marginal beliefs is slightly larger. In households where children substitute for parents,
mothers have higher beliefs in both total and marginal returns as compared to their children.
Table 6c: Distribution of Dissonance in Total and Marginal Returns to Education
Dissonance in Total Returns Dissonance in Marginal Returns
Domestic Worker (in Rs) -550 -125
Private/Government (in Rs) -1293 -768
Self-Employed (in Rs) -2438 -719
Daily Wages (in Rs) -641 -1464
Agriculture (in Rs) -3000 -1000
Unemployed (in Rs) -558 -1857
Notes: Data Sources are the Household Parent and Child Survey. The values represent the average of the respective
dissonance.
6.4 Beliefs on Educational Investments
Tables 6.1-6.4 present the estimates of mother’s beliefs to marginal returns to college on the investments made
by the household. Controlling for mother’s beliefs does not change the negative correlation of investments
with both occupational identity and substitution. The relationship between mother’s beliefs with monetary
and time investments is positive. This result is consistent with the literature that parent beliefs play a
important role in the educational investment decisions. Specifically, as shown in Table 6.2 the relationship
is significant for quantitative time investment indicating mothers of higher value of beliefs towards marginal
returns to college spends more time in the school-and-study-related activities of the chosen child. Although
the correlation between mother’s beliefs and monetary investment, qualitative time investment of the mother
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and time investment by the child is positive as shown in Tables 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4 respectively, the effect of
mother’s beliefs on those investments is not significant.
6.5 Dissonance in Total Returns on Educational Investments
Tables 6.5-6.8 present the estimates of dissonance in total returns to college on investments. I define positive
dissonance to be when a mother’s beliefs to total returns to college is higher than her child’s respective
beliefs and negative dissonance captures the other direction. The excluded category is no dissonance in
beliefs between the mother and the child. In about 20% of households there is no dissonance in the beliefs
for the total returns. The quantitative time investment of a mother significantly increases with positive
dissonance as shown in Table 6.6. As shown in Tables 6.5, 6.7 and 6.8, the correlation between the positive
dissonance and the monetary investments, qualitative time investment of the mother and the time investment
by the child is positive but not in a significant way.
In Tables 6.9-6.12, I show the household and the child characterisitics that correlates with such posi-
tive/negative dissonance. For this, I apply ordered logit to the dissonance variable that is coded to -1 if
a child’s beliefs are higher than its mother’s (negative dissonance), 0 if there is no dissonance and 1 if a
mother’s beliefs are higher (positive dissonance). The households in which there is child labor substitution
are more likely to have positive dissonance, that is, mothers are more likely to have higher beliefs as com-
pared to their children. The likelihood of positive dissonance in households that have child labor substitution
shows that a substitution decision is not because of a lower beliefs of a parent. The households in which
the mothers chose occupation to represent their self-image are more likely to have positive dissonance as
compared to the households in which the mothers chose other factors. Similarly, the households in which the
children chose occupation to represent their self-image are more likely to have positive dissonance as well.
This supports the claim that beliefs reflect the values individuals attach to certain factors. In households
with older mothers and mothers with higher education, the dissonance is less likely to be positive. Similarly,
among household characteristics, in households with higher levels of assets and income, the dissonance is less
likely to be positive as well. The households of School 1 children are more likely to have positive dissonance
as compared to the households of School 2 children. Among the gender of the chosen children, the households
of boys are less likely to have positive dissonance as compared to the households of girls. The households in
which children perform better at school are less likely to have positive dissonance. This is consistent with
the literature that school performance is positively related to the beliefs of the children.
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6.6 Dissonance in Marginal Returns on Educational Investments
Tables 6.13-6.16 present the relationship of dissonance in marginal returns to college with investments.
Similar to dissonance in total returns, the positive dissonance is when mothers’ beliefs to marginal returns
to college are higher than their respective child’s beliefs and the negative dissonance is when child’s marginal
beliefs are higher. As shown in Table 6.16, the children with higher marginal beliefs invests significantly
more time in the study-and-school-related activities. This result contrasts with the effect of dissonance in
total returns on investments. The correlation between negative dissonance and monetary investments is
negative as shown in Table 6.13. The correlation between negative dissonance with both quantitative and
qualitative time investments of the mother is positive as shown in Tables 6.14 and 6.15 but the effects of
negative dissonance on monetary and the time investments of mother are not significant.
Tables 6.17-6.20 shows the ordered logit estimates of characteristics of household, mother and the chosen
child on dissonance in marginal returns. The order for the dissonance in marginal returns is similar to the
order for the dissonance in total returns. The variable takes value -1 when the child’s beliefs to marginal
returns to college are higher, 1 when the mother’s beliefs to marginal returns to college are higher and 0
when there is no dissonance. In about 10% of the households there is no dissonance, which is lower than
the proportion of no dissonance in total returns. Similar to the estimates of dissonance in total returns, the
households that substitute their children’s labor for parents’ labor and the households in which the mothers
chose occupation towards their self-image are more likely to have positive dissonance. The households in
which the children chose occupation to represent their identity also more likely to have positive dissonance
as compared to the households in which the children chose other factors. Among the occupation categories,
households in which the mothers are engaged in domestic work and the households in which the mothers
are self-employed are more likely to have positive dissonance. The effect of a mother’s age, education and
assets are similar to the order of dissonance in total returns. The households of School 1 children are less
likely to have positive dissonance as compared to the households of School 2 children. The effect of gender
and school performance on this measure of dissonance is similar to the dissonance in total returns.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents a distinct perspective of beliefs in the form of dissonance within a household by
studying the investment decisions of parents. The pattern of positive dissonance and occupational identity
ascertain the values mothers place in the occupation factor as a component of their self-image. In addition,
the positive dissonance in households where there is child labor substitution shows that the substitution
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decision is not necessarily due to a mother’s lower value of beliefs. Importantly, the significant positive effect
of negative dissonance in marginal returns (child’s beliefs towards marginal returns to college is higher) on
time investment by a child shows that children value the educational gain of going to college more than their
mothers. Overall, this chapter produces descriptive evidence of the role of not just the beliefs but conflict
in such beliefs on a household’s investment decisions. The dissonance is an area of research that has to be
explored more to first identify the pattern of dissonance among low-income households. Then interventions
can be designed to minimize such dissonance between parent and child, which can collectively increase their
investments in education and result in more optimal schooling outcomes.
Table 6.1: Models of Monetary Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Monetary Investments
Child Substitution (0/1) -1516.4+ -1417.3+
(806.3) (801.6)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -440.0∗
(180.5)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -1007.5∗ -967.5∗
(421.7) (420.8)
Mother’s Beliefs to Returns to Education 16.14 21.25 21.04 21.49
(26.10) (26.11) (26.11) (26.02)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -63.59 44.21 73.28 -40.09
(425.4) (418.9) (419.1) (422.5)
Mother’s Age 82.41∗ 82.34∗ 84.86∗ 82.49∗
(35.75) (35.60) (35.60) (35.50)
Mother’s Education 4.460 -14.40 6.603 -7.743
(135.3) (135.3) (134.7) (134.4)
Total Income 68.15∗ 80.43∗ 76.92∗ 78.21∗
(32.93) (33.29) (33.09) (32.98)
Assets 296.3∗ 289.6∗ 283.6∗ 271.2∗
(135.0) (134.5) (134.7) (134.4)
School 1 -2661.1∗∗ -2521.2∗∗ -2476.2∗∗ -2538.5∗∗
(506.3) (504.3) (506.1) (505.5)
Gender 1226.8∗ 1156.2∗ 1240.5∗ 1264.3∗
(550.2) (548.1) (548.3) (546.5)
Birth Order -657.8∗ -759.0∗∗ -765.4∗∗ -703.0∗
(276.3) (273.4) (273.7) (275.0)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -236.4 -156.0 -137.7 -235.3
(419.0) (413.8) (413.8) (416.0)
Constant 4908.3∗∗ 5905.9∗∗ 4855.3∗∗ 5071.3∗∗
(1639.8) (1705.5) (1630.8) (1629.5)
R2 .25 .26 .26 .27
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.2: Models of Quantitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Quantitative Time Investment of Mother
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.0364 -0.0334
(0.142) (0.143)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0204
(0.0320)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.0291 -0.0281
(0.0750) (0.0752)
Mother’s Beliefs to Returns to Education 0.0143∗∗ 0.0145∗∗ 0.0144∗∗ 0.0144∗∗
(0.00461) (0.00463) (0.00463) (0.00464)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0746 0.0770 0.0781 0.0754
(0.0752) (0.0742) (0.0743) (0.0753)
Mother’s Age -0.00619 -0.00627 -0.00615 -0.00621
(0.00632) (0.00632) (0.00632) (0.00633)
Mother’s Education 0.0707∗∗ 0.0694∗∗ 0.0706∗∗ 0.0703∗∗
(0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0240)
Total Income -0.000947 -0.000371 -0.000713 -0.000679
(0.00585) (0.00593) (0.00589) (0.00591)
Assets 0.0231 0.0224 0.0226 0.0223
(0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0240)
School 1 -0.179∗ -0.173+ -0.173+ -0.175+
(0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0905) (0.0909)
Gender -0.126 -0.128 -0.125 -0.125
(0.0976) (0.0975) (0.0976) (0.0978)
Birth Order -0.0844+ -0.0875+ -0.0871+ -0.0856+
(0.0488) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0490)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0354 0.0370 0.0379 0.0356
(0.0741) (0.0734) (0.0734) (0.0742)
Constant 0.481+ 0.533+ 0.481+ 0.486+
(0.290) (0.302) (0.289) (0.290)
R2 .11 .11 .11 .11
N 304 304 304 304
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.3: Models of Qualitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Qualitative Time Investment of Mother Z score
Child Substitution (0/1) 0.196 0.221
(0.219) (0.218)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0682
(0.0491)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.239∗ -0.245∗
(0.114) (0.114)
Mother’s Beliefs to Returns to Education 0.00828 0.00928 0.00971 0.00963
(0.00708) (0.00710) (0.00707) (0.00707)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0920 0.0744 0.0802 0.0979
(0.115) (0.114) (0.113) (0.115)
Mother’s Age -0.00567 -0.00640 -0.00602 -0.00565
(0.00970) (0.00968) (0.00963) (0.00964)
Mother’s Education 0.249∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.246∗∗
(0.0367) (0.0368) (0.0364) (0.0365)
Total Income 0.00686 0.00929 0.00961 0.00941
(0.00893) (0.00905) (0.00896) (0.00896)
Assets 0.0697+ 0.0646+ 0.0614+ 0.0633+
(0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0365) (0.0365)
School 1 -0.384∗∗ -0.379∗∗ -0.362∗∗ -0.352∗
(0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137)
Gender -0.259+ -0.262+ -0.246+ -0.250+
(0.149) (0.149) (0.148) (0.148)
Birth Order 0.0114 0.0142 0.00974 -0.0000161
(0.0750) (0.0743) (0.0741) (0.0747)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker(0/1) -0.0701 -0.0874 -0.0851 -0.0698
(0.114) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113)
Constant -0.663 -0.440 -0.588 -0.621
(0.445) (0.464) (0.441) (0.443)
R2 .19 .20 .20 .21
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.4: Models of Time Investment by the Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Time Investment of Child
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.383 -0.387
(0.353) (0.354)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother 0.00181
(0.0794)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.0280 0.0390
(0.185) (0.186)
Mother’s Beliefs to Returns to Education 0.00872 0.00852 0.00838 0.00851
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0291 0.0597 0.0592 0.0282
(0.186) (0.184) (0.184) (0.186)
Mother’s Age 0.0536∗∗ 0.0542∗∗ 0.0542∗∗ 0.0536∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157)
Mother’s Education 0.00408 0.00825 0.00849 0.00457
(0.0592) (0.0595) (0.0592) (0.0593)
Total Income -0.00819 -0.00871 -0.00895 -0.00860
(0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146)
Assets 0.112+ 0.115+ 0.116+ 0.113+
(0.0590) (0.0592) (0.0593) (0.0593)
School 1 0.00714 0.0223 0.0192 0.00220
(0.221) (0.222) (0.223) (0.223)
Gender -0.208 -0.214 -0.216 -0.209
(0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241)
Birth Order -0.425∗∗ -0.441∗∗ -0.440∗∗ -0.423∗∗
(0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0224 0.0490 0.0490 0.0224
(0.183) (0.182) (0.182) (0.184)
Constant 9.844∗∗ 9.778∗∗ 9.778∗∗ 9.837∗∗
(0.717) (0.750) (0.717) (0.719)
R2 .08 .08 .08 .08
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.5: Models of Monetary Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Monetary Investments
Child Substitution (0/1) -1552.3+ -1453.3+
(805.6) (801.5)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -416.9∗
(179.8)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -968.8∗ -926.4∗
(419.7) (418.7)
Positive Dissonance 135.4 128.0 171.5 147.9
(546.1) (544.6) (544.5) (542.6)
Negative Dissonance -520.0 -464.3 -452.9 -496.6
(533.5) (531.5) (531.6) (530.1)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -61.92 44.12 73.10 -43.22
(424.4) (418.4) (418.4) (421.7)
Mother’s Age 83.88∗ 83.99∗ 86.34∗ 84.02∗
(35.71) (35.60) (35.59) (35.47)
Mother’s Education 2.811 -16.76 2.762 -11.54
(134.7) (135.0) (134.3) (134.0)
Total Income 70.57∗ 82.37∗ 79.07∗ 80.56∗
(32.86) (33.30) (33.08) (32.96)
Assets 327.5∗ 319.4∗ 314.8∗ 303.1∗
(136.3) (136.0) (136.2) (135.8)
School 1 -2733.8∗∗ -2609.8∗∗ -2560.4∗∗ -2630.6∗∗
(503.8) (501.6) (503.1) (502.7)
Gender 1244.4∗ 1174.0∗ 1257.9∗ 1280.8∗
(550.8) (549.4) (549.4) (547.4)
Birth Order -663.1∗ -763.6∗∗ -770.0∗∗ -706.5∗
(275.9) (273.4) (273.6) (274.8)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -240.6 -156.0 -138.5 -238.8
(418.3) (413.6) (413.5) (415.6)
Constant 5179.5∗∗ 6140.7∗∗ 5125.0∗∗ 5374.0∗∗
(1656.2) (1729.7) (1648.3) (1647.6)
R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.6: Models of Time Investment- Quantitative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Quantitative Time Investment of Mother
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.0210 -0.0200
(0.144) (0.145)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0101
(0.0323)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.00908 -0.00847
(0.0756) (0.0758)
Positive Dissonance 0.170+ 0.169+ 0.170+ 0.170+
(0.0977) (0.0977) (0.0977) (0.0979)
Negative Dissonance 0.155 0.156 0.156 0.155
(0.0955) (0.0954) (0.0954) (0.0957)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0661 0.0674 0.0679 0.0663
(0.0760) (0.0751) (0.0751) (0.0762)
Mother’s Age -0.00617 -0.00621 -0.00615 -0.00618
(0.00640) (0.00640) (0.00640) (0.00641)
Mother’s Education 0.0620∗ 0.0613∗ 0.0621∗ 0.0619∗
(0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0242)
Total Income -0.000322 -0.0000279 -0.000261 -0.000238
(0.00592) (0.00601) (0.00597) (0.00598)
Assets 0.0243 0.0240 0.0243 0.0241
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0245)
School 1 -0.202∗ -0.199∗ -0.200∗ -0.201∗
(0.0909) (0.0907) (0.0911) (0.0915)
Gender -0.116 -0.117 -0.116 -0.116
(0.0991) (0.0991) (0.0991) (0.0993)
Birth Order -0.0837+ -0.0854+ -0.0849+ -0.0841+
(0.0494) (0.0491) (0.0491) (0.0496)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0380 0.0391 0.0395 0.0381
(0.0750) (0.0744) (0.0744) (0.0752)
Constant 0.503+ 0.529+ 0.501+ 0.505+
(0.297) (0.311) (0.296) (0.298)
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
N 304 304 304 304
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.7: Models of Time Investment- Qualitative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Qualitative Time Investment of Mother Z score
Child Substitution (0/1) 0.208 0.233
(0.219) (0.218)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0606
(0.0489)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.227∗ -0.233∗
(0.114) (0.114)
Positive Dissonance 0.225 0.217 0.225 0.228
(0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148)
Negative Dissonance 0.156 0.151 0.155 0.162
(0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.144)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0899 0.0708 0.0760 0.0946
(0.115) (0.114) (0.113) (0.115)
Mother’s Age -0.00586 -0.00654 -0.00620 -0.00582
(0.00970) (0.00969) (0.00965) (0.00965)
Mother’s Education 0.243∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.237∗∗ 0.239∗∗
(0.0366) (0.0368) (0.0364) (0.0365)
Total Income 0.00677 0.00907 0.00953 0.00929
(0.00893) (0.00907) (0.00897) (0.00897)
Assets 0.0732∗ 0.0682+ 0.0652+ 0.0671+
(0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0369) (0.0370)
School 1 -0.381∗∗ -0.382∗∗ -0.366∗∗ -0.355∗∗
(0.137) (0.137) (0.136) (0.137)
Gender -0.243 -0.246 -0.230 -0.234
(0.150) (0.150) (0.149) (0.149)
Birth Order 0.0132 0.0170 0.0125 0.00228
(0.0750) (0.0744) (0.0742) (0.0748)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0671 -0.0849 -0.0828 -0.0667
(0.114) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113)
Constant -0.723 -0.506 -0.634 -0.674
(0.450) (0.471) (0.447) (0.448)
R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.8: Models of Time Investment by the Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Time Investment of Child
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.352 -0.357
(0.352) (0.353)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother 0.00315
(0.0789)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.0345 0.0449
(0.184) (0.184)
Positive Dissonance 0.0881 0.0939 0.0933 0.0875
(0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239)
Negative Dissonance 0.365 0.375 0.374 0.364
(0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.234)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0189 0.0470 0.0465 0.0180
(0.185) (0.184) (0.184) (0.186)
Mother’s Age 0.0530∗∗ 0.0535∗∗ 0.0535∗∗ 0.0530∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156)
Mother’s Education -0.00445 -0.000549 -0.000246 -0.00376
(0.0589) (0.0592) (0.0589) (0.0590)
Total Income -0.00849 -0.00907 -0.00934 -0.00897
(0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0145)
Assets 0.0988+ 0.102+ 0.103+ 0.1000+
(0.0595) (0.0597) (0.0598) (0.0598)
School 1 0.00893 0.0244 0.0212 0.00394
(0.220) (0.220) (0.221) (0.221)
Gender -0.206 -0.211 -0.213 -0.207
(0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241)
Birth Order -0.422∗∗ -0.437∗∗ -0.436∗∗ -0.420∗∗
(0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0274 0.0519 0.0519 0.0273
(0.183) (0.182) (0.181) (0.183)
Constant 9.778∗∗ 9.706∗∗ 9.707∗∗ 9.768∗∗
(0.724) (0.759) (0.723) (0.726)
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.9: Models of Dissonance-Total Returns
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Order of Dissonance in Total Returns
Child Substitution (0/1) 0.246
(0.423)
Occupational Identity of Child (0/1) 0.179
(0.218)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.00445
(0.229)
cut1 -0.254∗ -0.165 -0.269∗
(0.119) (0.173) (0.137)
cut2 0.547∗∗ 0.637∗∗ 0.532∗∗
(0.122) (0.177) (0.140)
N 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6.10: Models of Dissonance-Total Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Order of Dissonance in Total Returns
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0855
(0.221)
Whether Mother is a Domestic Worker (0/1) -0.0264
(0.314)
Whether Mother is a Private/Government Worker (0/1) -0.248
(0.310)
Whether Mother is an Agricultural Worker (0/1) -17.53
(5582.5)
Whether Mother is Self-Employed (0/1) -0.0594
(0.339)
cut1 -0.302∗ -0.274∗ -0.306∗ -0.278∗ -0.277∗
(0.142) (0.123) (0.124) (0.116) (0.122)
cut2 0.498∗∗ 0.527∗∗ 0.496∗∗ 0.525∗∗ 0.523∗∗
(0.144) (0.126) (0.126) (0.119) (0.124)
N 305 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.11: Models of Dissonance-Total Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)









cut1 -0.550 -0.417 -0.427 -0.276∗
(0.701) (0.294) (0.264) (0.117)
cut2 0.251 0.384 0.375 0.543∗∗
(0.701) (0.294) (0.264) (0.120)
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6.12: Models of Dissonance-Total Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)









cut1 -0.244 -0.318∗ -0.380 -0.911∗∗
(0.160) (0.132) (0.266) (0.330)
cut2 0.557∗∗ 0.484∗∗ 0.421 -0.0980
(0.163) (0.134) (0.266) (0.325)
N 305 305 305 304
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.13: Models of Monetary Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Monetary Investments
Child Substitution (0/1) -1512.4+ -1411.5+
(804.7) (800.0)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -413.0∗
(179.8)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -1008.6∗ -968.3∗
(420.0) (419.1)
Dissonance in Marginal Returns-Positive 356.3 333.6 438.5 445.0
(688.1) (686.0) (686.5) (684.1)
Dissonance in Marginal Returns-Negative -311.5 -282.8 -271.9 -265.8
(661.7) (660.0) (659.5) (657.1)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -40.38 61.38 93.05 -20.37
(425.1) (419.0) (418.6) (422.0)
Mother’s Age 82.81∗ 82.98∗ 85.14∗ 82.76∗
(35.77) (35.65) (35.61) (35.50)
Mother’s Education 18.91 -1.699 20.82 6.422
(135.5) (135.8) (134.8) (134.6)
Total Income 68.03∗ 79.98∗ 77.06∗ 78.37∗
(32.82) (33.25) (32.99) (32.88)
Assets 319.6∗ 312.4∗ 307.4∗ 295.0∗
(135.9) (135.6) (135.6) (135.3)
School 1 -2681.3∗∗ -2564.1∗∗ -2505.2∗∗ -2568.2∗∗
(501.8) (499.8) (501.1) (500.5)
Gender 1264.2∗ 1193.8∗ 1286.7∗ 1311.0∗
(554.1) (552.6) (552.3) (550.4)
Birth Order -645.4∗ -745.5∗∗ -751.9∗∗ -689.6∗
(276.0) (273.4) (273.3) (274.6)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -209.7 -129.7 -107.9 -204.9
(418.8) (414.1) (413.6) (415.8)
Constant 4968.9∗∗ 5942.8∗∗ 4908.2∗∗ 5122.2∗∗
(1709.9) (1780.1) (1700.4) (1698.7)
R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.14: Models of Quantitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Quantitative Time Investment of Mother
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.0309 -0.0299
(0.145) (0.145)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0107
(0.0325)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.00946 -0.00857
(0.0761) (0.0764)
Dissonance in Marginal Returns-Positive 0.0611 0.0607 0.0618 0.0619
(0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124)
Dissonance in Marginal Returns-Negative 0.0423 0.0430 0.0425 0.0426
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0633 0.0653 0.0659 0.0635
(0.0766) (0.0757) (0.0757) (0.0767)
Mother’s Age -0.00600 -0.00602 -0.00595 -0.00600
(0.00645) (0.00645) (0.00644) (0.00646)
Mother’s Education 0.0655∗∗ 0.0648∗∗ 0.0657∗∗ 0.0654∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0245)
Total Income 0.000274 0.000575 0.000327 0.000358
(0.00595) (0.00603) (0.00599) (0.00600)
Assets 0.0234 0.0231 0.0234 0.0232
(0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0246)
School 1 -0.221∗ -0.218∗ -0.219∗ -0.220∗
(0.0910) (0.0909) (0.0913) (0.0917)
Gender -0.121 -0.123 -0.121 -0.121
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Birth Order -0.0851+ -0.0873+ -0.0868+ -0.0855+
(0.0497) (0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0499)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0378 0.0394 0.0400 0.0379
(0.0756) (0.0749) (0.0749) (0.0757)
Constant 0.575+ 0.602+ 0.572+ 0.577+
(0.308) (0.322) (0.307) (0.309)
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
N 304 304 304 304
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.15: Models of Qualitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Qualitative Time Investment of Mother Z score
Child Substitution (0/1) 0.200 0.224
(0.220) (0.219)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0626
(0.0491)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.227∗ -0.233∗
(0.114) (0.115)
Dissonance in Marginal Returns-Positive 0.0405 0.0402 0.0629 0.0619
(0.188) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187)
Dissonance in Marginal Returns-Negative 0.0404 0.0472 0.0524 0.0515
(0.181) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0848 0.0659 0.0716 0.0896
(0.116) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115)
Mother’s Age -0.00563 -0.00632 -0.00601 -0.00564
(0.00976) (0.00974) (0.00970) (0.00971)
Mother’s Education 0.246∗∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.240∗∗ 0.243∗∗
(0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0367) (0.0368)
Total Income 0.00753 0.00987 0.0102 0.0100
(0.00895) (0.00909) (0.00899) (0.00899)
Assets 0.0692+ 0.0641+ 0.0614+ 0.0633+
(0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0369) (0.0370)
School 1 -0.407∗∗ -0.407∗∗ -0.390∗∗ -0.380∗∗
(0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137)
Gender -0.255+ -0.258+ -0.240 -0.244
(0.151) (0.151) (0.150) (0.151)
Birth Order 0.0110 0.0143 0.0103 0.000388
(0.0753) (0.0747) (0.0745) (0.0751)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0685 -0.0859 -0.0828 -0.0674
(0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114)
Constant -0.615 -0.400 -0.544 -0.578
(0.467) (0.487) (0.463) (0.464)
R2 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.16: Models of Time Investment by the Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Time Investment of Child
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.382 -0.387
(0.351) (0.353)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother 0.000792
(0.0789)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.0398 0.0508
(0.184) (0.185)
Dissonance in Marginal Returns - Positive 0.251 0.248 0.244 0.246
(0.301) (0.301) (0.302) (0.301)
Dissonance in Marginal Returns - Negative 0.486+ 0.484+ 0.482+ 0.483+
(0.289) (0.290) (0.290) (0.290)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0000766 0.0305 0.0300 -0.00113
(0.186) (0.184) (0.184) (0.186)
Mother’s Age 0.0523∗∗ 0.0530∗∗ 0.0530∗∗ 0.0523∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156)
Mother’s Education -0.00314 0.000980 0.00147 -0.00248
(0.0592) (0.0596) (0.0592) (0.0593)
Total Income -0.00740 -0.00790 -0.00830 -0.00795
(0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0145)
Assets 0.0973 0.101+ 0.102+ 0.0986+
(0.0593) (0.0595) (0.0596) (0.0596)
School 1 0.000307 0.0160 0.0116 -0.00563
(0.219) (0.219) (0.220) (0.221)
Gender -0.181 -0.188 -0.190 -0.183
(0.242) (0.243) (0.243) (0.243)
Birth Order -0.427∗∗ -0.444∗∗ -0.442∗∗ -0.425∗∗
(0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0230 0.0493 0.0493 0.0228
(0.183) (0.182) (0.182) (0.183)
Constant 9.641∗∗ 9.579∗∗ 9.574∗∗ 9.633∗∗
(0.747) (0.781) (0.747) (0.749)
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.17: Models of Dissonance-Marginal Returns
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Order of Dissonance in Marginal Returns
Child Substitution (0/1) 0.161
(0.446)
Occupational Identity of Child (0/1) 0.116
(0.227)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.217
(0.237)
cut1 0.148 0.208 0.208
(0.119) (0.180) (0.138)
cut2 0.583∗∗ 0.643∗∗ 0.643∗∗
(0.123) (0.183) (0.143)
N 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6.18: Models of Dissonance-Marginal Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Order of Dissonance in Marginal Returns
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.191
(0.231)
Whether Mother is a Domestic Worker (0/1) 0.348
(0.329)
Whether Mother is a Private/Government Worker (0/1) -0.00735
(0.312)
Whether Mother is an Agricultural Worker (0/1) -13.02
(716.9)
Whether Mother is Self-Employed (0/1) 0.182
(0.361)
cut1 0.0679 0.182 0.137 0.132 0.157
(0.142) (0.123) (0.124) (0.115) (0.121)
cut2 0.503∗∗ 0.618∗∗ 0.571∗∗ 0.568∗∗ 0.592∗∗
(0.145) (0.127) (0.128) (0.119) (0.125)
N 305 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6.19: Models of Dissonance-Marginal Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)









cut1 -0.133 -0.348 0.0705 0.144
(0.739) (0.310) (0.268) (0.116)
cut2 0.302 0.0906 0.505+ 0.586∗∗
(0.739) (0.310) (0.269) (0.120)
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6.20: Models of Dissonance-Marginal Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)









cut1 0.121 0.113 -0.0781 -0.681∗
(0.160) (0.133) (0.270) (0.336)
cut2 0.555∗∗ 0.548∗∗ 0.358 -0.237
(0.163) (0.137) (0.271) (0.334)
N 305 305 305 304
Standard errors in parentheses




In this dissertation, I study the determinants of educational investments of both money and time made by
low-income urban households in Chennai, India. Specifically, I highlight the role of two novel variables: child
labor substitution and occupational identity. With an innovative dataset built from scratch using household
survey and school performance data of households and children chosen from two public schools in Ambattur,
Chennai, India, I show how the level of educational investments vary when children substitute for their
parents labor and when parents choose occupation to represent her self-image/identity. By implementing
a new approach of an identity game to evaluate what matters to one’s self image, I document the identity
preferences of the mother and the chosen child. I find that the households in which the mother values
occupation more towards her identity invest less money and time in her child’s education. The households
in which children provide their labor to help the parent at work invest less money and spend less time
quantitatively but more qualitative time. The children who value occupation as a factor more towards their
identity score higher on school exams. The higher aspirational values of the parent affect time investments,
positively and significantly. The children with higher motivation levels perform higher on exams.
For mothers, the effect of occupational identity strength appears to come from the substitutable attribute
of the occupation. The fact that only 36% of employed mothers chose occupation as their identity reveals that
the perception of occupation depends on the type of occupation and whether that occupation is a result of
a decision-making process. For children, school performance and motivation seem to drive the occupational
identity strength. The effect of occupation towards identity is higher for girls as compared to boys. The
self-employed occupation category employs child labor at a higher rate as compared to other occupations
in the sample. Further, the results show that this sort of child substitution is more likely to happen if the
children are familiar with the mother and father’s work; if earnings potential of parents increase; and if it is
a common attribute of the occupation observed by the mother that the children substitute for their parents.
Both international child labor laws and Indian Child Labor Law allow light permissible work for children after
school. But without exploring the tradeoffs faced by school going children when they engage in such labor
substitution, presuming that light work do not affect schooling outcomes can be counterfactual. Though the
responses towards child labor substitution is small in absolute terms in the sample, the findings are indicative
that this type of labor prevails among school-going children and has implications in the educational decisions
made by the parents. The broader contribution of the dissertation is behavioral implications of an occupation
should be considered in concurrence with other resource constraints in studying the decision-making of poor
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households. Especially, when it comes to educational investments made by low-income parents, where there is
also child labor, knowing the impact of different attributes of occupation on such investment decisions might
enable us to answer beyond what the standard resource constraints can. Finally, there is less information on
the allocation of time of both parents and children in developing countries. Particularly, the information is
much scarcer for children who help parents at work and also go to school. To understand this cohort and their
parental decisions, in general, labor surveys should include detailed occupation-based survey questions that
target both economic and socio-behavioral aspects of occupations. In addition, I explore in this dissertation
the role of mother’s beliefs to marginal returns to college on educational investments. I found the mothers
who believe the marginal returns to college are higher significantly invest more quantitative time in their
children’s education. Further, I address the effect of dissonance in mother and child’s beliefs on monetary
and the time investments made by the household. I found in households in which the mothers believe the
returns to college level of education are higher as compared to their children’s beliefs to returns to college, the
mothers invests significantly more time in their children’s education. In households where children believe
the marginal returns to college are higher as compared to their mother’s beliefs to marginal returns to college
invests more time significantly in their school-and study-related activities.
The findings of the dissertation should be seen as an outcome of a descriptive case study approach, and
it does not intend to establish causality. While the findings may not be generalized to other populations in
terms of sign and significance, it provides a new channel of how educational investments can be uniquely
affected. There are a few areas that I would like to explore more, which I plan to address in continuing
research. One of those is to study whether the relationship observed between occupational identity and
investments in this sample hold when there is more heterogeneity in both type of occupation and type of
school. Also, a more concrete way to establish the impact of occupational identity strength on educational
attainment is to follow the students in my sample to see how many enroll in college and continue to tertiary-
level of education. Thus, the dissertation not only suggests an innovative way to think about educational




Table A.1: Models of Monetary Investments - Identity Block Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Monetary Investments
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -483.1∗ -471.1∗ -528.9∗∗ -472.3∗ -426.5∗
(197.4) (199.3) (200.6) (187.2) (179.6)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 338.8 212.2 182.5 28.41
(465.7) (466.9) (435.4) (418.2)
Mother’s Age 17.25 24.88 58.16 82.91∗
(37.83) (38.17) (36.80) (35.57)
Mother’s Education 52.64 -16.27 -28.83 -23.12
(149.5) (149.5) (140.6) (134.8)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 458.5 352.5 224.1 -154.3
(454.8) (452.7) (424.9) (413.5)
Total Income 77.80∗ 66.50+ 81.86∗
(37.11) (34.54) (33.22)








Constant 8076.0∗∗ 6818.0∗∗ 5971.1∗∗ 5525.9∗∗ 6079.4∗∗
(580.3) (1804.5) (1874.9) (1761.5) (1691.1)
R2 .02 .03 .06 .19 .26
N 305 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.17: Models of Monetary Investments Alternate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Monetary Investments w/o School Fees
Child Substitution (0/1) -1413.2+ -1322.7+
(745.9) (742.0)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -356.1∗
(166.7)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -899.5∗ -861.5∗
(388.8) (388.0)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 8.136 107.0 131.7 25.57
(393.2) (388.0) (387.5) (390.6)
Mother’s Age 52.91 53.26 55.30+ 53.09
(33.07) (33.01) (32.95) (32.85)
Mother’s Education -56.73 -71.92 -56.21 -69.79
(124.7) (125.0) (124.2) (124.0)
Total Income 48.39 58.47+ 56.53+ 57.76+
(30.39) (30.83) (30.59) (30.48)
Assets 225.5+ 221.9+ 214.9+ 203.3
(124.9) (124.7) (124.7) (124.4)
School 1 -665.1 -557.7 -512.0 -571.6
(461.6) (460.4) (461.0) (460.5)
Gender 1081.9∗ 1021.3∗ 1092.9∗ 1115.0∗
(509.0) (508.3) (507.6) (505.9)
Birth Order -512.6∗ -602.7∗ -611.5∗ -553.2∗
(255.6) (253.6) (253.4) (254.6)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -224.7 -146.6 -132.3 -223.3
(387.6) (383.7) (383.1) (385.1)
Constant 3502.9∗ 4321.8∗∗ 3489.9∗ 3695.5∗
(1497.8) (1569.1) (1491.5) (1490.4)
R2 .10 .10 .10 .11
N 305 305 305 305
Standard errors in parentheses























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.20: Models of Monetary Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Monetary Investments
Child Substitution (0/1) -1523.0+ -1424.8+
(806.1) (801.8)
Occupation Identity Strength of Mother -430.3∗
(179.6)
Occupation Identity of Mother (0/1) -980.4∗ -939.8∗
(419.6) (418.7)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -84.66 20.49 50.01 -65.77
(425.0) (418.5) (418.7) (422.2)
Mother’s Age 82.54∗ 82.76∗ 85.16∗ 82.80∗
(35.69) (35.55) (35.55) (35.45)
Mother’s Education (in years) -11.96 -18.10 -10.00 -16.74
(50.24) (50.23) (49.98) (49.95)
Total Income 70.62∗ 83.13∗ 79.34∗ 80.96∗
(33.00) (33.43) (33.21) (33.10)
Assets 299.9∗ 293.3∗ 287.6∗ 275.5∗
(134.8) (134.3) (134.6) (134.3)
School 1 -2714.6∗∗ -2592.7∗∗ -2548.4∗∗ -2612.6∗∗
(498.5) (496.1) (497.6) (497.1)
Gender 1220.4∗ 1150.6∗ 1233.7∗ 1256.4∗
(549.8) (547.9) (548.1) (546.3)
Birth Order -667.3∗ -767.5∗∗ -773.0∗∗ -711.4∗
(276.2) (273.5) (273.8) (275.0)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -244.1 -162.8 -143.2 -243.2
(419.4) (414.2) (414.2) (416.5)
Constant 5160.2∗∗ 6138.0∗∗ 5133.6∗∗ 5345.5∗∗
(1552.9) (1623.2) (1545.6) (1544.5)
N 305 305 305 305
R2 0.253 0.258 0.257 0.265
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.21: Models of Monetary Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Monetary Investments
Child Substitution (0/1) -1515.8+ -1414.2+
(816.3) (812.3)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -426.8∗
(181.1)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -970.0∗ -928.2∗
(423.0) (422.2)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -121.8 -10.87 17.76 -100.9
(427.3) (420.4) (420.6) (424.6)
Mother’s Age 85.83∗ 85.16∗ 87.21∗ 85.45∗
(36.05) (35.92) (35.92) (35.81)
Mother’s Education- Primary -1067.7 -1352.7 -1354.2 -1112.1
(1312.2) (1300.1) (1300.8) (1303.7)
Mother’s Education- Elementary -337.3 -468.1 -472.5 -443.1
(721.4) (720.1) (720.6) (718.3)
Mother’s Education- Upper Elementary 147.0 -85.56 27.77 84.38
(632.2) (633.6) (630.1) (628.7)
Mother’s Education- High School 24.82 -85.16 -34.65 -57.56
(587.3) (588.0) (586.6) (584.7)
Mother’s Education- College -1351.6 -1542.4 -1356.9 -1464.7
(1212.6) (1213.7) (1208.3) (1205.7)
Mother’s Education- Graduate -3311.4 -2816.8 -2605.3 -2768.7
(3455.4) (3445.2) (3452.4) (3441.6)
Total Income 86.31∗ 97.56∗∗ 93.92∗∗ 96.12∗∗
(34.51) (34.87) (34.67) (34.57)
Assets 296.2∗ 293.0∗ 284.8∗ 271.1∗
(135.9) (135.4) (135.8) (135.5)
School 1 -2801.5∗∗ -2687.6∗∗ -2651.2∗∗ -2709.3∗∗
(505.4) (503.1) (504.4) (503.8)
Gender 1100.5+ 1026.8+ 1103.0∗ 1126.7∗
(560.1) (558.3) (558.4) (556.6)
Birth Order -683.7∗ -790.4∗∗ -792.4∗∗ -730.3∗∗
(279.3) (276.7) (277.0) (278.3)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -336.3 -256.8 -233.3 -331.0
(424.9) (419.8) (419.9) (422.1)
Constant 4989.3∗∗ 6112.9∗∗ 5125.6∗∗ 5243.4∗∗
(1627.0) (1705.9) (1624.8) (1620.5)
N 305 305 305 305
R2 0.261 0.267 0.266 0.274
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.22: Models of Quantitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Quantitative Time Investment of Mother
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.0252 -0.0245
(0.145) (0.145)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0107
(0.0324)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.00721 -0.00649
(0.0758) (0.0760)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0659 0.0676 0.0681 0.0661
(0.0762) (0.0753) (0.0753) (0.0764)
Mother’s Age -0.00595 -0.00598 -0.00592 -0.00596
(0.00641) (0.00641) (0.00641) (0.00642)
Mother’s Education (in years) 0.0240∗∗ 0.0238∗∗ 0.0241∗∗ 0.0239∗∗
(0.00904) (0.00908) (0.00903) (0.00907)
Total Income -0.000299 0.0000142 -0.000263 -0.000233
(0.00595) (0.00604) (0.00600) (0.00601)
Assets 0.0240 0.0237 0.0240 0.0238
(0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0243)
School 1 -0.228∗ -0.225∗ -0.226∗ -0.227∗
(0.0901) (0.0900) (0.0903) (0.0907)
Gender -0.127 -0.129 -0.127 -0.127
(0.0990) (0.0990) (0.0991) (0.0992)
Birth Order -0.0856+ -0.0875+ -0.0869+ -0.0859+
(0.0495) (0.0492) (0.0493) (0.0497)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0399 0.0412 0.0417 0.0400
(0.0753) (0.0746) (0.0746) (0.0755)
Constant 0.712∗ 0.739∗ 0.710∗ 0.713∗
(0.279) (0.293) (0.278) (0.280)
N 304 304 304 304
R2 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.23: Models of Quantitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Quantitative Time Investment of Mother
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.00143 -0.000163
(0.146) (0.147)
Occupation Identity Strength of Mother -0.0147
(0.0327)
Occupation Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.0114 -0.0114
(0.0764) (0.0766)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0701 0.0698 0.0704 0.0704
(0.0766) (0.0756) (0.0757) (0.0768)
Mother’s Age -0.00664 -0.00674 -0.00665 -0.00665
(0.00647) (0.00647) (0.00647) (0.00648)
Mother’s Education - Primary -0.243 -0.244 -0.244 -0.244
(0.235) (0.234) (0.234) (0.236)
Mother’s Education - Elementary 0.155 0.152 0.154 0.154
(0.129) (0.129) (0.130) (0.130)
Mother’s Education - Upper Elementary 0.119 0.113 0.118 0.118
(0.113) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114)
Mother’s Education - High School 0.242∗ 0.237∗ 0.241∗ 0.241∗
(0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106)
Mother’s Education - College 0.237 0.225 0.235 0.235
(0.223) (0.225) (0.224) (0.224)
Mother’s Education - Graduate 0.906 0.918 0.912 0.912
(0.619) (0.620) (0.621) (0.622)
Total Income 0.000530 0.00100 0.000646 0.000646
(0.00619) (0.00627) (0.00624) (0.00625)
Assets 0.0249 0.0243 0.0246 0.0246
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0245)
School 1 -0.229∗ -0.227∗ -0.228∗ -0.228∗
(0.0912) (0.0912) (0.0914) (0.0918)
Gender -0.123 -0.124 -0.122 -0.122
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Birth Order -0.0872+ -0.0887+ -0.0878+ -0.0878+
(0.0501) (0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0503)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0300 0.0294 0.0302 0.0301
(0.0762) (0.0755) (0.0755) (0.0763)
Constant 0.747∗ 0.790∗ 0.750∗ 0.750∗
(0.292) (0.307) (0.292) (0.293)
N 304 304 304 304
R2 0.091 0.092 0.091 0.091
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.24: Models of Qualitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Qualitative Time Investment of Mother Z score
Child Substitution (0/1) 0.217 0.242
(0.220) (0.219)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0638
(0.0491)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.229∗ -0.236∗
(0.114) (0.114)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0936 0.0733 0.0787 0.0983
(0.116) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115)
Mother’s Age -0.00632 -0.00702 -0.00665 -0.00625
(0.00974) (0.00973) (0.00969) (0.00969)
Mother’s Education (in years) 0.0886∗∗ 0.0855∗∗ 0.0863∗∗ 0.0874∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0137)
Total Income 0.00490 0.00740 0.00778 0.00750
(0.00901) (0.00915) (0.00905) (0.00905)
Assets 0.0717+ 0.0666+ 0.0635+ 0.0656+
(0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0367) (0.0367)
School 1 -0.409∗∗ -0.409∗∗ -0.394∗∗ -0.383∗∗
(0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136)
Gender -0.254+ -0.257+ -0.241 -0.245
(0.150) (0.150) (0.149) (0.149)
Birth Order 0.0111 0.0149 0.0105 0.0000408
(0.0754) (0.0749) (0.0746) (0.0752)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0538 -0.0729 -0.0705 -0.0536
(0.115) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114)
Constant -0.209 0.00434 -0.127 -0.163
(0.424) (0.444) (0.421) (0.422)
N 305 305 305 305
R2 0.181 0.183 0.190 0.193
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.25: Models of Qualitative Time Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Qualitative Time Investment of Mother Z score
Child Substitution (0/1) 0.195 0.221
(0.223) (0.222)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother -0.0630
(0.0496)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) -0.228∗ -0.235∗
(0.115) (0.115)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0817 0.0630 0.0684 0.0870
(0.117) (0.115) (0.115) (0.116)
Mother’s Age -0.00566 -0.00628 -0.00602 -0.00575
(0.00984) (0.00983) (0.00979) (0.00979)
Mother’s Education - Primary 0.119 0.148 0.145 0.107
(0.358) (0.356) (0.354) (0.356)
Mother’s Education - Elementary 0.537∗∗ 0.525∗∗ 0.515∗∗ 0.510∗∗
(0.197) (0.197) (0.196) (0.196)
Mother’s Education - Upper Elementary 0.795∗∗ 0.776∗∗ 0.788∗∗ 0.779∗∗
(0.173) (0.173) (0.172) (0.172)
Mother’s Education - High School 0.987∗∗ 0.962∗∗ 0.962∗∗ 0.966∗∗
(0.160) (0.161) (0.160) (0.160)
Mother’s Education - College 1.088∗∗ 1.027∗∗ 1.043∗∗ 1.060∗∗
(0.331) (0.332) (0.329) (0.330)
Mother’s Education - Graduate 1.611+ 1.643+ 1.723+ 1.749+
(0.944) (0.943) (0.941) (0.941)
Total Income 0.00956 0.0120 0.0124 0.0120
(0.00942) (0.00954) (0.00945) (0.00945)
Assets 0.0685+ 0.0636+ 0.0600 0.0622+
(0.0371) (0.0371) (0.0370) (0.0371)
School 1 -0.417∗∗ -0.416∗∗ -0.403∗∗ -0.394∗∗
(0.138) (0.138) (0.137) (0.138)
Gender -0.263+ -0.266+ -0.253+ -0.256+
(0.153) (0.153) (0.152) (0.152)
Birth Order 0.0115 0.0136 0.00946 -0.000237
(0.0763) (0.0757) (0.0755) (0.0761)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) -0.0813 -0.0986 -0.0952 -0.0800
(0.116) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115)
Constant -0.361 -0.157 -0.278 -0.297
(0.444) (0.467) (0.443) (0.443)
N 305 305 305 305
R2 0.191 0.193 0.200 0.202
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.26: Models of Time Investment by the Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Time Investment of Child
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.378 -0.383
(0.353) (0.354)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother 0.00784
(0.0790)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.0408 0.0517
(0.185) (0.185)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0238 0.0547 0.0539 0.0228
(0.186) (0.184) (0.184) (0.186)
Mother’s Age 0.0538∗∗ 0.0545∗∗ 0.0544∗∗ 0.0538∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156)
Mother’s Education (in years) 0.00127 0.00336 0.00334 0.00153
(0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0220)
Total Income -0.00754 -0.00836 -0.00855 -0.00811
(0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0146)
Assets 0.111+ 0.115+ 0.116+ 0.113+
(0.0590) (0.0591) (0.0592) (0.0593)
School 1 -0.0214 -0.00661 -0.00980 -0.0271
(0.218) (0.218) (0.219) (0.219)
Gender -0.207 -0.213 -0.216 -0.209
(0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241)
Birth Order -0.425∗∗ -0.440∗∗ -0.439∗∗ -0.423∗∗
(0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0241 0.0511 0.0509 0.0240
(0.184) (0.182) (0.182) (0.184)
Constant 9.920∗∗ 9.839∗∗ 9.853∗∗ 9.909∗∗
(0.680) (0.714) (0.680) (0.682)
N 305 305 305 305
R2 0.082 0.078 0.079 0.082
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.27: Models of Time Investment by the Child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Time Investment of Child
Child Substitution (0/1) -0.358 -0.362
(0.357) (0.359)
Occupational Identity Strength of Mother 0.00786
(0.0797)
Occupational Identity of Mother (0/1) 0.0224 0.0331
(0.186) (0.186)
Whether Mother is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0298 0.0600 0.0594 0.0291
(0.187) (0.185) (0.185) (0.187)
Mother’s Age 0.0509∗∗ 0.0514∗∗ 0.0513∗∗ 0.0509∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158)
Mother’s Education - Primary -0.579 -0.639 -0.639 -0.577
(0.574) (0.572) (0.572) (0.575)
Mother’s Education - Elementary -0.0749 -0.0793 -0.0787 -0.0711
(0.316) (0.317) (0.317) (0.317)
Mother’s Education - Upper Elementary 0.106 0.0958 0.0940 0.109
(0.277) (0.279) (0.277) (0.278)
Mother’s Education - High School -0.127 -0.117 -0.118 -0.124
(0.257) (0.259) (0.258) (0.258)
Mother’s Education - College 0.0725 0.107 0.104 0.0765
(0.531) (0.534) (0.532) (0.532)
Mother’s Education - Graduate 1.419 1.448 1.441 1.399
(1.513) (1.516) (1.519) (1.519)
Total Income -0.00654 -0.00747 -0.00745 -0.00689
(0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153)
Assets 0.104+ 0.108+ 0.108+ 0.104+
(0.0595) (0.0596) (0.0597) (0.0598)
School 1 -0.0533 -0.0406 -0.0417 -0.0565
(0.221) (0.221) (0.222) (0.222)
Gender -0.219 -0.224 -0.226 -0.220
(0.245) (0.246) (0.246) (0.246)
Birth Order -0.413∗∗ -0.427∗∗ -0.427∗∗ -0.411∗∗
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123)
Whether Father is a Daily-Wage Worker (0/1) 0.0263 0.0515 0.0511 0.0261
(0.186) (0.185) (0.185) (0.186)
Constant 10.06∗∗ 10.00∗∗ 10.02∗∗ 10.05∗∗
(0.712) (0.751) (0.715) (0.715)
N 305 305 305 305
R2 0.092 0.089 0.089 0.092
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.28: Correlation of Substitution Variables
Variable 1 Variable 2 Correlation P-Value
Panel A: Parent and Chosen Child Response
Child Substitution-Parent Response Child Substitution- Chosen Child Response 0.6911* 0.0000
-For Mother -For Mother 0.7302* 0.0000
-For Father -For Father 0.5999* 0.0000
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Child Substitution-Chosen Child Mother (0/1) 0.7100* 0.0000
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Child Substitution-Chosen Child Father (0/1) 0.4901* 0.0000
Panel B: Other Substitution Variables
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Substitution Common-Mother’s Work 0.3552* 0.0000
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Whether Earning Potential Increases-Mother 0.4381* 0.0000
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Whether Earning Potential Increases-Father 0.2487* 0.0000
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Whether Child Knows to do Mother’s work 0.4612* 0.0000
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Whether Child Knows to do Father’s work 0.5881* 0.0000
Panel C : Dependent Variables
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Monetary Investments -0.0838 0.1441
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Time Investment-Quantitative -0.0380 0.5092
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Time Investment-Qualitative 0.0273 0.6348
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Time Investment-Child -0.0883 0.1238
Panel D: Occupational Identity
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Occupational Identity Strength-Mother 0.0542 0.3459
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Occupational Identity Strength-Child -0.0539 0.3479
Panel E: School Performance
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Total Points -0.0187 0.7455
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Total Absence 0.0274 0.6336
Panel E: Behavioral Variables
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Role Model for Mother due to Occupation 0.1450* 0.0112
Child Substitution-Parent Response (0/1) Parental Aspiration 0.0035 0.9515
Notes: Data sources are Household Parent Survey and Household Child Survey.
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Table A.29: Correlation of Occupational Identity Variables
Variable 1 Variable 2 Correlation P-Value
Panel A: Parent and Chosen Child Response
Identity Strength-Mother Identity Strength-Child
-Occupation -Occupation 0.0831 0.1474
-Mother Tongue -Mother Tongue 0.1215* 0.0339
-Relationship -Relationship 0.1032 0.0719
-Birthplace -Birthplace 0.1112 0.0523
Panel B: Dependent Variables
Occupational Identity Strength-Mother Monetary Investments -0.1392* 0.0150
Occupational Identity Strength-Mother Time Investment-Quantitative -0.0339 0.5557
Occupational Identity Strength-Mother Time Investment-Qualitative -0.1003 0.0804
Occupational Identity Strength-Mother Time Investment-Child -0.0035 0.9508
Occupational Identity Strength-Child Time Investment-Child 0.1041 0.0695
Panel C: Behavioral Variables
Occupational Identity Strength-Mother Role Model for Mother due to Occupation -0.0074 0.8979
Occupational Identity Strength-Mother Parental Aspiration 0.0008 0.9888
Occupational Identity Strength-Child Role Model for Child due to Occupation 0.0122 0.8315
Occupational Identity Strength-Child Child Motivation 0.1197* 0.0367
Notes: Data sources are Household Parent Survey and Household Child Survey.
Table A.30: Correlation of School Performance Variables
Variable 1 Variable 2 Correlation P-Value
Total Points Occupational Identity Strength-Child 0.1734* 0.0024
Total Points Occupational Identity Strength-Mother -0.0519 0.3672
Total Points Parent Child Disagreement -0.1963* 0.0006
Total Points Parental Aspiration 0.1823* 0.0014
Total Points Child Motivation 0.1218* 0.0338
Total Absence Occupational Identity Strength-Child -0.2028* 0.0004
Total Absence Total Points -0.4128* 0.0000
Total Absence Child Substitution 0.0274 0.6336
Notes: Data source is School Performance Data.
127
Table A.31: Statistical Difference Between School 1 and School 2
Variables School 1 -Mean School 2-Mean P-Value
Occupational Identity Strength-Mother (1-4) 2.809 2.640 0.0914
Occupational Identity Strength-Child (1-4) 3.467 3.300 0.0539
Monetary Investment (in Rs) 5150 8359 0.0000
Monetary Investment-Alternate (in Rs) 4270 5403 0.0010
Time Investment-Quantitative (in hrs.) .31 .49 0.0045
Time Investment-Qualitative (Z -Score) -.13 .13 0.0128
Time Investment-Child (in hrs.) 11.13 11.01 0.7723
Total Points 276.29 250.73 0.0081
Parent Child Disagreement (0-4) .99 1.5 0.0010
Parental Aspiration (2-4) 3.11 3.18 0.0977
Child Motivation (5-12) 11.24 11.04 0.0447
Notes: Data sources are Household Parent Survey and Household Child Survey.
Table A.32: Statistical Difference Between Gender in School 2
Variables Boys Girls P-Value
Occupational Identity Strengh-Child (1-4) 3.14 3.48 0.0154
Monetary Investment (in Rs) 9032 7620 0.0148
Monetary Investment Alternate (in Rs) 5980 4770 0.0178
Time Investment- Quantitative (in hrs.) .43 .56 0.0891
Time Investment- Qualitative (Z-Score) -.003 .27 0.0289
Time Allocation on HH Chores (in hrs.) .50 .16 0.0000
Time Allocation on Entertainment (in hrs.) 1.9 1.3 0.0001
Total Points 234.45 268.58 0.0185
Total Absence (no of days) 19.81 16.37 0.0258
Parent Child Disagreement (0-4) 1.9 1.1 0.0003
Notes: Data sources are Household Parent Survey and Household Child Survey.
Table A.33: Comparison of Time Allocation Between US and India
US India
Unpaid domestic services for household members (in hrs.) 2.54 4.98
Unpaid caregiving services for household members (in hrs.) 2.37 2.23
Socializing and communication, community participation and religious practice (in hrs.) 2.15 2.32
Culture, leisure, mass-media and sports practice (in hrs.) 5.12 2.75
Notes: Data sources are American Time Use Survey, 2019 and Time Use Survey - India, 2019. The time denotes the average
time spent in a day per participant.
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